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Constructing Class Action Reality
Debra Lyn Bassett∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Class actions have become quite controversial.1 We regularly hear
class actions criticized as a form of “extortion”2 or “legalized
blackmail.”3 Politicians and some commentators routinely denounce
law, lawyers, and class actions all in the same breath, as if all were
uniformly and universally unfair, unethical, and out of control4—all
∗ Loula Fuller and Dan Myers Professor of Law, Florida State University College of
Law; dbassett@law.fsu.edu. Many thanks to Rex Perschbacher and Mark Seidenfeld for their
insightful comments on a previous draft, and to Jared Sine and the editors of the BYU Law
Review for their helpful editing suggestions. I am grateful to Florida State University College
of Law for its generous research assistance.
1. John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private
Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2005) (“Recent surveys indicate growing
public distrust of the class action device. . . . [C]lass actions are now widely perceived as little
more than a money generator for attorneys.”); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart”
and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1377, 1377 (2000) (stating that class settlements are “the most controversial subject in the
civil process today”).
2. See, e.g., Greg Burns & Michael J. Berens, The Class Action Game, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
7, 2004, at C1 (stating that large corporations refer to class actions as “a legal extortion
racket”); Michael J. Flaherty, Debt Collection: Know the Fair Debt Law and Follow It, A.B.A. J.,
May 1999, at 73 (stating that class action settlements can “become exercises in extortion”);
Michael Katz, Hush Money, FORBES, Mar. 19, 2001, at 52 (describing a proposed—but
subsequently withdrawn—class action settlement as “extortion”).
3. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[C]lass actions create the opportunity for a kind of legalized
blackmail . . . .”); Michelle Singletary, In Class Actions, a Litany of Frustrations, WASH. POST,
Nov. 14, 1999, at A20 (quoting a press release from DaimlerChrysler Vice President Lew
Goldfarb as stating that class actions were “a form of legalized blackmail”); Donald Young,
Plan Would Enrich Lawyers, USA TODAY, June 20, 2001, at 16A (analogizing “expensive
class-action litigation” to “legalized blackmail”). Analogizing class actions to legalized
blackmail is not new; the analogy has floated around for at least three decades. See Milton
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The TwentyThird Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (characterizing consumer
class actions as “legalized blackmail”); Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and
Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 842, 843 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Curbs on Class Action Lawsuits Urged, WASH. POST, June
12, 2003, at A6 (addressing proposal to change the law “to make it harder to file class action
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part and parcel of the same litigation “explosion.”5 Of course, there
isn’t any litigation explosion6—but that does not stop the allegations
or the anti-lawyer, anti-class action sentiment.7

lawsuits” and stating that “lawmakers need to limit trial lawyers’ ability to seek courts—
generally at the state level—that might be especially sympathetic to class action suits”);
Matthew Mosk, Suits Challenge Retroactive Laws, WASH. POST, June 7, 2000, at B4 (“Earlier
this year, Maryland legislators said the greed of trial lawyers had driven them to support a series
of laws that effectively shielded HMOs, cable companies and other corporate interests from
potentially huge class-action judgments.”); William Spielberger, Lawyers, Shakespeare and a
Desperate Man, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 2005, § 1, at 17 (In the last presidential election,
“crowds were urged to support tort reform, restrict class actions, limit liability awards, stop
‘frivolous lawsuits,’ roll back civil-rights protections. And who was standing in the way of these
reformations of our laws? That’s easy—the trial lawyers!”); William Tucker, Why We Should
Decriminalize Crime, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 29 (“There is no Association of
the Trial Lawyers of America pushing the interests of civil defendants in Congress. Plaintiff
work attracts all the professional excitement, as attorneys constantly mine new ground for
malpractice and class-action suits. As usual, the law schools and professional associations follow
suit.”); id. (noting the “greed . . . of the legal profession”); Jim VandeHei, GOP Plans New
Caps on Court Awards, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2002, at A5 (“President Bush and his
congressional allies in the past two years have written into federal law new limits on the
public’s ability to sue . . . . Sen. Trent Lott . . . said in an interview that trial lawyers, who he
likened to a ‘pack of wolves,’ . . . [were bringing] ‘outlandish class-action lawsuits.’”).
5. Claims regarding the litigious nature of American society are asserted both generally
and with respect to virtually every sort of specific type of lawsuit imaginable. See, e.g., Thomas
Adcock, Lawyers Without Clients, LEGAL TIMES, June 9, 2003, at 43 (referring to the United
States as “perhaps the most litigious society the world has ever known”); Christopher S.
Burnside et al., Mold Spores: Bad Science or Bad Dream?, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 18, 2002, at B13
(asserting that “[m]old is the next litigation explosion”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley
Act: Coming Litigation Crisis, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 10, 2003, at B8 (warning that Sarbanes-Oxley
Act will result in litigation crisis due to increased securities litigation); see also Debra Lyn
Bassett, When Reform Is Not Enough: Assuring More than Merely “Adequate” Representation in
Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 927 n.3 (2004) (providing additional examples).
6. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4, 5 (1983) (noting that “per capita rates of litigation in United States courts fall in the
same general range as those of England, Australia, Ontario (Canada) and others”); Marc
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 6–7, 38 (1986)
(concluding that the empirical data does not support claims of a litigation explosion); Marc S.
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (noting that the number of federal and
state trials peaked in the mid-1980s and have declined ever since); Deborah L. Rhode,
Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54
DUKE L.J. 447, 456 (2004) (“Scholars have debunked [the] claim [that the United States is
experiencing an escalating epidemic of litigation and has become ‘the world’s most litigious
nation’] so often that it is startling how much bunk survives.”); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really
Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147, 1154–68 (1998) (stating that the claims of a litigation explosion are anecdotal and
overblown).

1416

BASSETT.MRO.DOC

1415]

1/20/2007 1:04:49 PM

Constructing Class Action Reality

This controversy regarding class actions has brought calls for
reexamination and reform. As one might expect, legislative
reforms—both proposed and enacted—have sought “quick fixes” for
perceived problems and shortcomings in class action practice.8 More
surprisingly, the calls for reexamination in the academic legal
literature have proffered proposals that not only contradict the
historical understanding of class actions, but indeed erode and
undermine the very foundation of the theoretical justification for
class actions—and thus seek not merely innovation or reform, but
actually seek to construct a new class action reality. Moreover, these
recent proposals seek to construct this new class action reality in a
remarkably uniform manner—and one that raises significant
constitutional issues. Specifically, this reconstruction of class action
reality pits two inherent components of class actions against each
other: one that focuses on the representative nature of the class
action device, and one that focuses on the aggregate, or efficiency,
component of class actions.
Both aggregation and representativeness are inherent to class
actions. “Aggregation”—the bringing together of multiple claims in
a single lawsuit for reasons of judicial economy—is, of course, the
primary underlying rationale for the class action device. A class action
permits numerous claims to be adjudicated simultaneously without
the need for each individual class member to institute a separate
lawsuit. But class actions are more than merely large-scale
aggregation devices. As shown in both the historical development of

7. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1269–70 (2005).
A persistent and well-funded campaign depicts American civil justice as a
pathological system, presided over by arrogant activist judges and driven by greedy
trial lawyers, biased juries, and claimants imbued with victim ideology who bring
frivolous lawsuits with devastating effects on the nation’s health care system and
economic well-being. Although the available evidence overwhelmingly refutes these
assertions, this set of beliefs, supported by folklore and powerfully reinforced by
media coverage, has become the reigning common sense.
Id. (citing WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW (2004)).
8. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1453, 1711–1715 (2005)) (having a primary purpose of shifting many
class actions from state court to federal court); see also Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005,
H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc
.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h420rh.txt.pdf (proposed legislation that would render
Rule 11 sanctions mandatory and would limit venue options in both state and federal courts).
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class actions and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,9 as a general
matter, a judgment involving aggregated claims binds only the
named parties. To bind the entire class—both the named and
unnamed class members—a representative component must be
satisfied. “Representativeness” is the due process requirement that
the interests of the unnamed class members be adequately
represented by those participating in the lawsuit. This representative
component acts as a constraint on class actions’ aggregation
component—in recognition of the relinquishment of their day in
court, only those unnamed class members who were adequately
represented will be bound by the class judgment.
Part II sets out an overview of the core theoretical guideposts of
this Article—the linguistic and the accompanying substantive
distinctions between a “representative” versus an “aggregate”
foundation and focus in constructing class action reality.10 Part III
explores some of the historical underpinnings to the class action
device.11 Part IV examines and analyzes the descriptive terminology
used in the United States Supreme Court’s class action case law.12
Finally, Part V analyzes the important distinctions between an
“aggregate” and a “representative” construction of class actions,
examines some of the proposals from prominent voices in the
academy, and explains why the current trend toward an “aggregate”
construction—despite leading to some innovative and interesting
analytical approaches—would yield a new, and undesirable, class
action reality.13
II. OVERVIEW: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A “REPRESENTATIVE”
VERSUS “AGGREGATE” FOCUS
Class actions unquestionably have both a “representative”
component and an “aggregate” component. A class action proceeds

9. See infra notes 64–127 and accompanying text (discussing the historical
development of class actions and the Supreme Court’s class action jurisprudence).
10. See infra notes 14–63 and accompanying text (examining distinctions between a
“representative” focus and an “aggregate” focus).
11. See infra notes 64–89 and accompanying text (reviewing historical background of
the class action device).
12. See infra notes 90–127 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence with respect to a “representative” versus an “aggregate” focus).
13. See infra notes 128–222 and accompanying text (analyzing the implications of a
new class action reality shifting to an “aggregate” focus).
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through the use of one or more named plaintiffs14 who serve as class
representatives and who represent the interests of all class members,
both present and absent.15 A class action also involves claims of
individuals that are heard together, or aggregated, into a single
lawsuit. Despite the existence of this aggregation component, class
actions traditionally have emphasized the representative component,
because it is this representative feature that provides the due process
basis for binding absent class members to the class judgment.
Indeed, an emphasis on the representative nature has been the
hallmark of class actions since their inception.16 The promulgation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, followed closely by the
1940 United States Supreme Court decision in Hansberry v. Lee,17
firmly established adequate representation as central to the legitimacy
of class actions. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,18
14. Defendant classes are also possible, but are far less common. See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties . . . .”)
(emphasis added); 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 3:2, at 215–16 (4th ed. 2002) (“Another type of class is the defendant class. An individual or
a class plaintiff may sue a named defendant as representative of a class of other defendants
similarly situated.”); see also Robert R. Simpson & Craig Lyle Perra, Defendant Class Actions,
32 CONN. L. REV. 1319, 1322–23 (2000) (noting defendant class actions are rare). Indeed, a
plaintiff class may sue a defendant class. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1770, at 481–86 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing problems that arise
when defendant class is being sued by plaintiff class).
15. The Supreme Court has suggested that the adequacy of representation requirement
in class actions takes its root from the “historic tradition that everyone should have his own day
in court.” Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 & n.2 (1989) (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4449, at 417 (1st ed. 1981)),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071,
1076 as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Several
commentators have expressed disagreement with the “day in court” model as applied to class
actions. See Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied
Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1855 (2004) (“Virtual
representation in a class action, along with others similarly situated, is simply not equivalent to
one’s day in court. That’s fine with me.”); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party
and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 923 (1998) (arguing that the “day in court” model
distorts class action analysis). The validity (or invalidity) of the “day in court” model is not
necessary to my analysis, and I leave it to another day.
16. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832 (1999) (“[R]epresentative suits have
been recognized in various forms since the earliest days of English law.” (citing generally
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION (1987))); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
“representative action” as “class action”).
17. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rule 23, of course, is not the exclusive path to class actions,
which also can be brought under, for example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
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which authorizes class actions in the federal courts, frames its
authorization in terms of adequate representation.19 In Hansberry,
the Supreme Court held that adequate representation was not merely
one of four prerequisites to maintaining a class action, but instead
equated adequate representation with due process.20 This seminal
case served as the critical moment for the emergence of class actions
as we know them today. Since Hansberry, the Supreme
Court repeatedly has reaffirmed adequate representation
as the decisive determinant of a class judgment’s binding effect.21
Thus, the theoretical and constitutional underpinnings of class
actions are linked to their representative character, a point
widely acknowledged by traditional terminology. The leading class
action treatise, for example, states, “The fundamental nature of a
class suit is its representative status,”22 and both case law23 and
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)). Class actions are also permitted under state law in
almost all states.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties . . . .”).
20. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45.
21. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
22. 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 1:2, at 14; see id. § 1:1, at 2 (“Class actions
are representative suits on behalf of groups of persons similarly situated.”); see also CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 510 (6th ed. 2002)
(“[A class action] provides a means by which, when a large group of persons are interested in a
matter, one or more may sue or be sued as representatives of the class without needing to join
every member of the class.”).
23. See, e.g., Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261, 264 (8th
Cir. 1944) (“This is properly an instance for application of the ‘class’ or ‘representative’ action
authorized by Rule 23(a).”); see also Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303
(1853) (“In all cases where . . . a few are permitted to sue and defend on behalf of the many,
by representation, care must be taken that persons are brought on the record fairly
representing the interest or right involved, so that it may be fully and honestly tried. . . . The
legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all being before the court by representation, and
especially where the subject-matter of the suit is common to all, there can be very little danger
but that the interest of all will be properly protected and maintained.”); Hess v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 479–80 & n.29 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (citing Smith v. Swormstedt,
supra, as “one of the oldest cases on the subject” and stating that in Swormstedt, “after
referring to the fact that class actions are exceptions to the rule which requires that an action
be instituted only on behalf or against persons who are actually before the court . . . states that
it is the function of the court to insure that the persons before the court truly represent the
rights to be adjudicated”); id. at 479 (“I am of the view that in any one of the three forms of
actions allowed, (1) the ‘true’ form of class action, (2) the ‘hybrid’ form or (3) the ‘spurious’
class action, the court must be satisfied that the persons before it will fairly insure adequate
representation of all.”).
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commentary24 have traditionally used the term “representative” to
describe class actions.
Class actions are also legitimately viewed as a litigation device—
perhaps the key litigation device—allowing aggregate resolution of
multiple claims, whether brought by plaintiffs or asserted against
defendants. Class actions are, in fact and without question, one of
the several devices, including joinder, intervention, and interpleader,
among others, for bringing multiple claims together in a single
lawsuit. Accordingly, we would expect to find the term “aggregate”
in the class action case law as well.
Interestingly, however, the term “aggregate” most frequently
appears in the class action case law in the limited context of
explaining whether a class action lawsuit satisfied the requisite
amount in controversy. For example, the basic federal diversity
jurisdiction statute currently requires that the matter in controversy
exceed “the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.” 25 In the class action context, the question has been whether
each individual class member was required independently to satisfy
24. Note, Developments in the Law: Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71
HARV. L. REV. 877, 934 (1958) (“The historical function of a class action was to decide
questions common to all the members of the class in one proceeding without the necessity of
all the members appearing in court. Thus it was properly considered a representative action.”
(footnote omitted) (citing Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41–42 )).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). The grant of diversity jurisdiction appeared in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and Congress codified diversity jurisdiction in title 28 of the United
States Code in 1940. Act of Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 177, 54 Stat. 143 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
41(1)(b) (1946)). In 1948, Congress amended title 28 to fashion its current structure. Act of
June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1332, 62 Stat. 869, 930 (1948). The Judiciary Act of
1789 required the existence of more than $500 in controversy, in addition to diversity of
citizenship, to invoke diversity jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §
11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789). Congress has repeatedly increased the amount necessary to satisfy
the amount in controversy, from the original $500 in the Judiciary Act to $2,000 in 1887, Act
of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887); to $3,000 in 1911, Act of Mar. 3, 1911,
§ 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (1911); to $10,000 in 1958, Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85554, § 1332, 72 Stat. 415, 415–16 (1958); to $50,000 in 1988, The Judicial Improvements
and Access to Justice Act, Act of Nov. 19, 1988, § 201, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642,
4646 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)); to $75,000 in 1996, Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996)
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). The reason articulated for these increases to the amount in
controversy has consistently been to reduce the number of diversity cases that may be heard in
federal court. See S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3 (1958) (stating that the Committee on the
Judiciary believed the increased amount in controversy would reduce the federal court
workload); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 44–45 (1988) (stating that the increased
amount in controversy would reduce the number of diversity cases in the federal courts and
would adjust for inflation).
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the jurisdictional amount, or whether the class members could
aggregate—add together—their claims to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount in total. The aggregation rule, which originated in 1832,26 is
stingy, and the general rule was that aggregation was not
permitted.27 In the specific context of class actions, the original
version of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discussed
in greater detail in Part III below, divided class actions into three
types—“true” class actions, “hybrid” class actions, and “spurious”
class actions28—and aggregation in the jurisdictional sense was
permitted for only the “true” class action.29 When the drafters
revised Rule 23 in 1966, a question arose as to whether class
26. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 3704, at 142–43 (citing Oliver v.
Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832)).
27. In individual litigation, the general rule is that aggregation is not permitted, subject
to two exceptions: (1) a single plaintiff may aggregate her own claims against a single
defendant, and (2) aggregation is permitted when the plaintiffs are “enforc[ing] a single title or
right in which they have a common and undivided interest.” Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332,
335 (1969).
If a single plaintiff has two entirely unrelated claims against a single defendant, and
each of them is for $38,000, the two claims may be joined and a single suit may be
brought in a federal court, because the aggregate of the two claims exceeds
$75,000. If two plaintiffs each have a $38,000 claim against a single defendant,
however, they may not aggregate their claims in a single action and may not sue in a
federal court, no matter how similar the claims may be, so long as the claims are
regarded as “separate and distinct.” Only if the claims are based on a common
undivided interest may multiple plaintiffs aggregate their claims to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount requirement.
14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 3704, at 127–28 (citations omitted).
28. See Note, Developments in the Law: Class Action, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1321
(1976) (“In 1966, the Supreme Court promulgated an amended rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, replacing a rule that had remained unchanged since 1938. The 1938 rule
. . . reflect[ed] Professor Moore’s famous distinctions among ‘true,’ ‘hybrid,’ and ‘spurious’
class suits . . . .”); see also infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text (discussing the original
Rule 23 categories).
29. Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Del. 1949).
It is well settled that in a “true” class action in the federal courts, whether
jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship or upon a federal question arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the claims of all the members
of the class may be aggregated for the purpose of obtaining the requisite
jurisdictional amount.
On the other hand, if the action is either a “hybrid” class suit under Rule
23(a)(2) or a “spurious” class suit under Rule 23(a)(3), then the claims of the
several members of the class may not be aggregated to determine jurisdictional
amount, but rather the claim of each party-plaintiff must at least equal the requisite
jurisdictional amount specified in the statute in order for the court to have
jurisdiction as to him.
Id. (citation omitted).
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members could now aggregate claims as a result of the
amendments—an assertion that the Supreme Court rejected.30
Accordingly, from a historical perspective, aggregation was not a
feature common to all class actions—but all class actions were
considered representative suits.
Of greater importance is the fact that the two terms—
“representative” and “aggregate”—convey different concepts and
have a different emphasis. Representative generally means to act in
the place of another; “representative” is defined as “a person or
thing that represents another or others[;] . . . an agent.”31
Aggregate, on the other hand, is to add together; “aggregate” is
defined as “formed by the conjunction or collection of particulars
into a whole mass or sum; total; combined”; “in the aggregate” is

30. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338; see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292–93
(1973), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-650, §
310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113 as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
545 U.S. 546 (2005). See generally 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 3704, at 161
(noting that in Zahn, supra, the Supreme Court “reaffirmed the long-standing rule . . . that
the claims of multiple parties, when separate and distinct, cannot be aggregated for
jurisdictional amount purposes”); S. R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right, in Suit Brought as Class
Action, To Aggregate Claims or Interests of Members of Class in Order To Satisfy Minimum
Jurisdictional Amount Requirement in Federal District Court, 3 A.L.R. FED. 372, 380 (1970)
(“It has been generally held or recognized that the mere fact that those purporting to sue as
members of a class have complied with the procedural requirements governing the joinder of
claims will not entitle them to aggregate the amounts of their claims for purposes of satisfying
the jurisdictional amount requirement.”). Recent developments, however, have rendered many
class action aggregation issues moot. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(d)(6), 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (Supp. 2006) (requiring the court to aggregate “the claims of the
individual class members . . . to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $5,000,000”); Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. 546 (permitting the use of
supplemental jurisdiction in class actions to cover individual class members’ claims that do not
satisfy the jurisdictional amount).
31. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1635 (2d ed.
unabridged 1987) [hereinafter RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY]; see also THE NEW MERRIAMWEBSTER POCKET DICTIONARY 425 (1971) [hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY]
(defining “representative” as “standing or acting for another”); WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 728 (1963) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY] (defining
“represent” as “to act in the place of or for usu. by legal right”). See generally BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1328 (defining “representative” as “[o]ne who stands for or
acts on behalf of another . . . . See AGENT”).
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defined as “taken or considered as a whole.”32 Accordingly,
“aggregate” suggests largeness.33
Similarly, neither term is unique to class actions. Adding claims
together—aggregate litigation—occurs in a number of contexts,
including traditional joinder,34 consolidation,35 interpleader,36
intervention,37
multidistrict
litigation,38
and
bankruptcy.39
Representative litigation occurs in other contexts as well, including
an executor or administrator of an estate,40 a guardian ad litem

32. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 38; see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 10 (defining “aggregate” as “formed by the gathering of units
into one mass”); WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 18 (defining “aggregate” as “the
whole sum or amount: sum total”). See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at
72 (defining “aggregate” as “[f]ormed by combining into a single whole or total . . . [t]o
collect into a whole”).
This notion is also found in the “aggregate theory of partnership.” See id. at 10
(defining “aggregate theory of partnership” as “[t]he theory that a partnership does not have a
separate legal existence (as does a corporation), but rather is only the totality of the partners
who make it up”); see also Douglas A. Kahn & Faith Cuenin, Guaranteed Payments Made in
Kind by a Partnership, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 405, 417 (2004) (noting the “age-old conflict of
whether a partnership should be treated as a separate entity or merely as a representative of the
aggregate of interests of its partners”). An “entity” approach appears in some of the class
action literature in the context of conflict of interest concerns. See Bassett, supra note 5, at 975
n.232 (arguing against a “class as entity” approach to conflicts of interest); Nancy J. Moore,
Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1477, 1485–86 (proposing
that classes should be treated as entity clients for purposes of the ethical rules).
33. Roget’s New Millennium Thesaurus, http://thesaurus.reference.com/search?q
=bulk (last visited Oct. 21, 2006) (defining “bulk” as “largeness,” and listing “aggregate” as
its synonym).
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (permissive joinder of claims); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19
(compulsory joinder of parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties).
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (consolidation).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (rule interpleader); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (Supp. 2006)
(statutory interpleader).
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (intervention).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (multidistrict litigation).
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. 2006) (setting forth the priorities of expenses and
claims against the bankruptcy estate); see also John D. Ayer, Debt Abides: A Prolegomena for
Any Future Chapter 11, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 427, 452 (2004) (noting that bankruptcy law is
“a device for (a) maximizing the value of assets and (b) ‘orchestrating’ creditors’ claims”).
40. See HLC Props., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 105 P.3d 560, 567 (Cal. 2005) (“When
Crosby died, his privilege transferred to his personal representative, i.e., the executor of his
estate.”); In re Estate of Ramlose, 801 N.E.2d 76, 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“LaSalle Bank was
appointed as executor of the estate of Alexander Ramlose, now deceased, and appears in that
capacity in this appeal as [Ramlose’s] representative.”); Dawson v. Ohio Dep’t of Human
Servs., 588 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (“An executor may ordinarily prosecute in
his representative capacity any cause which his decedent could have instituted. The executor of
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protecting the legal interests of a minor or incapacitated person,41
and a bankruptcy trustee.42 However, the distinction between the
concepts of representative litigation and aggregation is striking. To
aggregate simply involves bringing additional claims within the same
lawsuit, while representative litigation invokes concerns beyond mere
numbers. In class actions, adequate representation implicates both
fiduciary obligations43 and constitutional due process,44 and thereby
goes to the very legitimacy of the litigation—determining the
ultimate validity of the judgment. Moreover, as Professor Mullenix
has noted, class actions are the only type of aggregate litigation to
require adequate representation of claimants “as a matter of due
process.”45
Although the traditional construction of class action reality
permits the aggregation, or bringing together, of claims, the class
judgment binds absent class members only when the class action
satisfies the “representative” component. As a prerequisite to due
process, the representative nature of the class action necessarily and
appropriately serves as the foundation and focus of the class action
device. Recent commentary, however, seeks to reconstruct the class
action reality by shifting to a focus on the aggregate—a focus, in
an estate, as a legal representative, settles the decedent’s affairs and ‘stands in [the decedent’s]
shoes’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).
41. See Sarracino v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 53, 61–62 (Cal. 1974) (“The guardian ad
litem . . . is . . . the incompetent’s representative of record . . . .”); Keling v. Keling, 155
S.W.3d 830, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“[By statute,] the appointed guardian ad litem shall
be the legal representative of the child at the hearing.”).
42. See Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 849 (1989)
(“The bankruptcy trustee is ‘the representative of the estate [of the debtor].’” (quoting 11
U.S.C. § 323(a) (2000))); Alvarez v. Alvarez (In re Alvarez), 224 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir.
2000) (“The bankruptcy trustee is the legal representative of the bankruptcy estate . . . .”).
43. Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 173 n.10 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A]s class
representatives, the moving plaintiffs have fiduciary duties towards the other members of the
class.” (citing Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 331 (1980))); see also
Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A
representative [class] plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the other [members of the class].”); Becherer
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 193 F.3d 415, 434 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting
that “the class representative assumes a fiduciary relationship” to the class).
44. See infra notes 96–127 and accompanying text (discussing adequate representation
as a prerequisite for due process).
45. Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 436 (1999); see also Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that a consent decree between an employer and AfricanAmerican employees could not bind the conflicting claims of white employees who did not
join in the consent decree).
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essence, on the efficiency component of class actions. This recent
trend is seen most readily by looking at a recent development in class
action terminology.
It has become something of a fad to use the term “aggregate
litigation” to describe class actions46—in perhaps the most prominent
example, the American Law Institute, best known for its
“Restatements of the Law,” is currently undertaking a project which
addresses class actions and is entitled “Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation.”47 The reasoning behind this trend to invoke
the “aggregate” label is not entirely clear. One potential reason is
mere novelty or variety—essentially seeking an occasional synonym
to avoid overuse of the term “class action” within the particular
writing. Another potential reason is the seeking of a systematic
substitute (rather than an occasional synonym), specifically to avoid
the negative connotations associated with the term “class actions.”48
A third potential, and legitimate, reason is to employ the term
“aggregate litigation” to discuss a broad variety of litigation devices
for grouping claims together, and thereby encompassing such
devices as class actions, interpleader, intervention, joinder, and

46. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1475, 1478 nn.14–15 (2005); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in
an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 400 (2005); Elizabeth J. Goldstein,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: A Need for Technical Innovation, 104 DICK. L. REV. 653,
653–55, 675–76, 678 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right To
Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1067 (2002); Linda S. Mullenix,
Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 742 (1998); David Rosenberg, Adding a Second
Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 52
n.57; Shapiro, supra note 15, at 918; Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action
Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 719 n.2 (2005).
47. Am. Law Inst., American Law Institute—Projects and Participants: Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation, http://www.ali.org/ali/PP5.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
48. Cabraser, supra note 46, at 1478 n.14.
Given the recent resistance to expanding the application of Rule 23 itself, and the
negative baggage that the term “class action” has accumulated, utilitarian reform
efforts focused on providing courts and litigants with clear, fair, and useful
procedural mechanisms for deciding common questions in ways that preclude the
necessity of endless relitigation have adopted alternative terminology, for both real
and symbolic reasons. For example, the American Law Institute has commenced a
project dedicated to developing “Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation,”
recognizing that the formal class action is not the only means by which to effectively
organize complex litigation, and that previously underutilized mechanisms and
principles, including collateral estoppel, voluntary joinder, and interjurisdictional
coordination hold promise.
Id.
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consolidation within a single unifying term.49 A comprehensive term
for such multiple-claim devices can be useful when seeking common
themes among those devices but otherwise has little theoretical or
practical utility. In a sense, the term “aggregate litigation,” as a
general linguistic shorthand for multiple-claim devices, is not
significantly more helpful than simply using the term “joinder” or
“multiple claims.” Moreover, except in the specific circumstances
where class actions are indeed being examined for their similarities to
interpleader, intervention, and similar devices, the use of the word
“aggregate” seems to impart more than merely a sense of “joinder”
or “multiple claims,” but instead seems to connote “large scale.”
Even if this trend is more style than substance, the choice
matters. The use of “aggregate litigation” as a synonym or substitute
for “class action” is ultimately both inaccurate and damaging,
because in such a context the term “aggregate litigation” is
historically inaccurate, is only partially accurate today, and is unwise
and ultimately unfair to the class action device.

49. See Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,
26–29 (1991) (discussing class actions, consolidation, interpleader, joinder, intervention,
multidistrict litigation, bankruptcy, and the appointment of special masters or experts as forms
of “aggregate litigation”). In an early draft, the American Law Institute’s “Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation” included mention of class actions, permissive joinder,
intervention, in rem actions, interpleader, and consolidation. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 4.01–.04, 6.0, at 5–8, 15–18 (Prelim. Draft No. 2,
Apr. 20, 2005). If the project’s focus remains diffuse, this would, of course, warrant the
broader “aggregate litigation” title. However, if the project’s genuine focus—and virtually all
of its content—becomes class litigation, its title would then be employing “aggregate
litigation” as a class action synonym. A more recent ALI draft greatly condensed the discussion
of the various types of aggregate proceedings, although most of the general principles still
apply to all types of aggregate litigation and not just to class actions. AM. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02, at 6–11 (Prelim. Draft No. 4,
Sept. 21, 2006).
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Terminology matters.50 Our language is often ambiguous,51 and
words convey both overt and subtle meanings.52 Words can also

50. The idea that “words matter” is found frequently in the legal literature. See, e.g.,
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND (2004)
(discussing dangers of hate speech); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993)
(discussing unprotected speech); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982)
(discussing harms caused by racial insults); Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free Speech: The
Case Against Substantive Equality, 82 IOWA L. REV. 645, 682 (1997) (“Words matter and
have consequences . . . .”); Douglas Laycock, Constitutional Theory Matters, 65 TEX. L. REV.
767, 774 (1987) (“[W]ords . . . do not communicate perfectly, but words are all we have.
Practical people know that those words matter.”); Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 508 (2005) (“[I]n the practice of law, words matter
enormously.”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 327
(1995) (“It is undeniable that a good deal of speech—and not just pornography or hate
speech—does matter; it may construct reality, create stereotypes, or affect attitudes and
behavior.”).
51. Derek Auchie, The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule, 25 STATUTE L.
REV. 40, 51 (2004) (“The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision.”
(quoting Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 K.B. 481, 489–99 (C.A.))); Robert A.
Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109, 139
(1998) (“The limits of the English language ensure ambiguity . . . .”); Terri LeClercq,
Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous Modifiers, 40 TEX. J. BUS.
L. 199, 202–04 (2004) (noting the “inherent ambiguities in the English language”);
Symposium, A Matter of Life and Death: New Jersey’s Death Penalty Statute in the 21st Century,
23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 298 (1999) (noting that “we have inadequacies in language”
and that “there are inherent ambiguities in the English language”).
52. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1948) (“Words generally have
different shades of meaning . . . .” (quoting Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 258
(1937))); LeClercq, supra note 51, at 201 (noting “how difficult it can be to achieve clarity
using the multifaceted English language”); Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation,
Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 139–40 (1998) (“Some
words lacerate more than others; some words hide more than others. Even when words carry
hidden meanings, they can profoundly influence how we think. Language plays an important
role in reality control.”); see also Samuel P. Hays, Forest Values, New and Old: Comments on
David Clary’s Timber and the Forest Service, 17 ENVTL. L. 707, 716 (1987) (noting “the
more subtle meaning of language”).
For example, in the 1950s the words “multiple use” referred to those new uses of
recreation, fish, wildlife, and wilderness in contrast to the earlier dominant
commodity uses. In the ensuing years, however, the heavy focus on the wilderness
debate reversed the meaning as commodity users, bolstered now by motorized
recreationists, took up the banner of multiple use in the face of their single-use
wilderness opponents. Now, however, the pendulum is swinging back to the 1950s
as the many new types of users identify timber and its associated road building as
their “single-use” enemy under the banner of multiple-use.
On an even more subtle level, changes in the real world of debate are giving
rise to new meanings not recognized by old terms.
Id.
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create “spin”—meaning “[t]o provide an interpretation of (a
statement or event, for example), especially in a way meant to sway
public opinion.”53 The words we select can emphasize certain aspects
or attributes54 and can downplay others.55 Accordingly, and
particularly in the already politicized area of class actions,56
terminology deserves attention.57
Since class actions are a form of aggregate litigation, there is
nothing inherently illegitimate about the “aggregate litigation” label.
In fact, as previously noted, the use of the term “aggregate
litigation” potentially removes the pejorative associations connected
to the term “class action,” and thus may serve to keep the reader’s
mind more open to the ensuing discussion. However, there are
deeper substantive meanings that accompany this terminology. The
term “aggregate litigation” carries a particular “spin” that differs
53. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=spin.
Both political parties take advantage of the ability of language to influence opinion
. . . . To offset the ire of some environmentalists, Frank Luntz, a Republican
strategist, has called for “softer, greener language” about the environment—the
Republicans’ most vulnerable issue. So he urged Republicans to use the term climate
change instead of global warming. They no longer refer to environmental issues;
they are now conservationist issues. A Sierra Club consultant acknowledged that the
new language has succeeded in blunting the Democratic attack.
Gertrude Block, Language for Lawyers, FED. LAW., Jun. 2003, at 45.
54. See Ethan Bronner, Poll Shows Shift Toward Support of Abortion Rights, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1989, at 1 (reporting on differences in poll results depending on how the
pollsters phrased the questions, and noting this “indicate[s] why supporters of abortion rights
emphasize so strongly the word ‘choice’ in their campaigns and slogans”); Paul Gewirtz &
Chad Golder, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19 (When “Democrats
or Republicans seek to criticize judges or judicial nominees, they often resort to the same
language. They say that the judge is ‘activist.’”).
55. See J.A. BARNES, A PACK OF LIES: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LYING 115 (1994)
(“[A] war may seem less sour if it is called an ‘international armed conflict,’ the Pentagon term
for the carnage in Vietnam. . . . Terms such as these anesthetize us more selectively than the
simple use of traditional metaphors.”).
56. See Del Jones, Allstate CEO: Firms Should Be Politically Active, USA TODAY, Jul. 18,
2005, at 3B (“President Bush signed a bill in February that will send most class-action lawsuits
into federal courts. It was regarded as a major victory for business, as was the bankruptcy bill
that starting in October will make it more difficult for consumers to avoid paying debt. . . . A
key man behind the law is Edward Liddy, CEO of Allstate, who chairs the Business
Roundtable’s Civil Justice Reform Task Force. Liddy isn’t finished. Asbestos and medical
liability are next on his wish list.”).
57. Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, Colloquy, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid—
Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 791, 811 (1991) (“[E]very
litigator or drafter of legal documents knows the power and importance of each chosen word.
Language is a mechanism of power.” (citation omitted)).
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from that associated with representative litigation. Using “aggregate
litigation” to describe class actions emphasizes numbers or size. This
focus on numbers renders a sense of “aggregate litigation” as
intimidating and overwhelming, perhaps suggesting unwieldiness—a
view consistent with the discredited idea of a litigation explosion.
The natural response is to try to make the claims go away—by
concentrating on reducing court dockets, attaining global
settlements, and preventing subsequent challenges so as to preserve
those settlements. These goals often are framed in terms of
“efficiency” and “economy”—meaning to dispose of many claims in
a single proceeding.58 Although efficiency and economy certainly are
among the goals of class litigation,59 the term “aggregate litigation,”
when used as a synonym for “class action,” has the effect, whether
intended or not, of emphasizing these convenience factors—thus
detracting from, and undervaluing, the more distinctive and
constitutionally-mandated goal of adequate representation.
The class action feature that is both most distinctive and most
compelling for the preservation of the class action device is not the
ability to aggregate claims—it is the class action’s representative
nature. Adding claims together is neither a difficult concept nor
difficult to achieve;60 attaining genuinely adequate representation for
all claimants is both. And while adding claims together is convenient,
it is merely one advantage of the class action device.61 Unlike the
aggregate feature of class actions—meaning that a class action folds
numerous claims into a single lawsuit—the representative nature of
class actions is both central to the class action concept and rises to a
constitutional dimension. Adequate representation is a due process

58. Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unintended Consequences in
Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts To Streamline the Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71
MISS. L.J. 531, 542 (2001) (“In the mid-1980s judges began to allow cases to be consolidated
because it promoted efficiency and allowed judges to dispose of many cases at once.”).
59. See 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 3:3, at 220 (noting that judicial
economy is one of the objectives of the class action device).
60. William Gaus, State and Federal Employment Class Actions and Other Representative
Actions, in 31ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 205, 217 (2002) (“Satisfaction
of the numerosity requirement is rarely an issue.”).
61. 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 1:1, at 3 (“One major advantage of class
actions to the courts, attorneys, and litigants is the judicial economy and efficiency they can
achieve.”).
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prerequisite.62 Thus, “aggregate litigation” is a poor class action
synonym because its overinclusiveness63 necessarily downplays and
minimizes the distinctive representative nature of class actions.
The primary significance of this linguistic development is that it
reflects an underlying conceptual movement. The use of “aggregate
litigation” as a synonym or substitute for “class action” reflects an
underlying movement in the legal literature to construct a new class
action reality—a movement that, in the name of efficiency, would
inherently and necessarily compromise existing due process
protections for absent class members. A fuller understanding of the
potential impact of this movement requires a fuller understanding of
class action reality as originally constructed and, in particular, the
significance of its “representative” and “aggregate” components.
The original construction of class action reality can be found in the
historical background of, and the Supreme Court jurisprudence
pertaining to, the class action device. Accordingly, these are the
subjects of the next two Parts.
III. A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF CLASS ACTIONS
Historically, class actions have embraced both a “representative”
component and an “aggregate” component. Although laypersons
often believe class actions to be a recent development, group
litigation extends back for centuries.64 Indeed, Professor Yeazell has
traced the earliest published sources of group litigation to the year
1199.65 Class actions are a procedural device developed in

62. Id. § 1:7, at 28 (“When adequate representation is present, then the essential
adjudicatory characteristic of representative litigation can be realized, to wit, the adjudication
of common questions, whether favorable or not, will be binding on class members.”).
63. Some class actions, such as those authorized by Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), may
involve large numbers but are unlike traditional “aggregate” litigation—for example, they seek
law reform or are part of a constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987) (Rule 23 class action involving constitutional claims of prisoners); Alsina-Ortiz v.
LaBoy, 400 F.3d 77, 80 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing consent decree resulting from class
action that was “designed to reform conditions and health care in the Puerto Rico prison
system”).
64. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in
Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 687–88 (1997); see also 1 CONTE & NEWBERG,
supra note 14, § 3:3, at 219 (“Class actions trace their beginning to the English common law
of equity.” (citation omitted)).
65. Yeazell, supra note 64, at 688. Professor Yeazell describes this early case
entertainingly:
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equity,66 in which the named plaintiffs act as representatives for
themselves and for a class of similarly-situated others in pursuing a
remedy.67 The historical purpose “of a class action was to decide
questions common to all the members of the class in one proceeding
without the necessity of all the members appearing in court.”68 Thus,
the historical conception of the class action was not merely the
creation of an “aggregation” device to dispose of multitudinous
claims, but also a true “representative” device to facilitate bringing
multiple claims to the court.

On the eve of the thirteenth century, Martin, the rector of a parish, brought suit
against four of his parishioners—as representatives of the rest—asserting his right to
certain parochial fees. I am sad to say that Father Martin was in part insisting that his
parishioners carry the bodies of their dead several miles to a place where he could
bury them for a customary fee; alternatively, he was benevolently prepared to let
them bury their deceased in a nearby chapel graveyard—so long as they remitted to
Martin the same customary burial fee as he would have earned had he conducted the
service himself. Not an edifying or happy tale.
Id. Professor Yeazell has extensively researched the historical background of class actions. See
generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION (1987) (tracing the history of the class action); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group
Litigation to Class Action, 27 UCLA L. REV. 514, 523–35 (1980) (noting the emergence of
new group litigants after the industrialization of nineteenth-century England); Stephen C.
Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 866, 876 (1977) (discussing seventeenth-century British antecedents to the class
action device).
66. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948) (“The
class action was an invention of equity, mothered by the practical necessity of providing a
procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of individuals, united
in interest, from enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their equitable
wrongs.” (citation omitted)). See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple
Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (1932) (discussing the bill of peace in equity); Note,
supra note 24, at 928 (discussing devices enabling classes of individuals to sue or be sued).
67. Oswald v. Gen. Motors Corp. (In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig.),
594 F.2d 1106, 1127 n.33 (7th Cir. 1979) (describing class action device as primarily
vindicating rights of individual class members and also as vehicle for furthering substantive
policies behind legislation); Welmaker v. W.T. Grant Co., 365 F. Supp. 531, 553 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (“The traditional purpose of a class action is to generate incentive to litigate claims that
would otherwise not be litigated because they are so small as to make it impractical to bring
individual suits.”).
68. See Note, supra note 24, at 934 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41–42
(1940)).
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From 1833 until 1912, Equity Rule 4869 governed representative
litigation in the federal courts.70 The Equity Rules were revised in
1912, and Equity Rule 48 was repealed. However, the basic
representative litigation device remained, and was incorporated in
Equity Rule 38. This rule, which is “probably the most
straightforward of all the rules adopted to date to provide for class or
representative actions,”71 provided that “[w]hen the question is one
of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.”72 Thus, Equity
Rule 38 contained both the “representative” and the “aggregate”
components that we continue to associate with class actions.
The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of course, created a
single form of civil action, merging together law and equity.73
Original Rule 23, which was incorporated in the 1938 Rules and
addressed class actions,74 was “primarily an attempt to codify, not to
69. See FED. R. EQ. 48 (1842) (repealed 1912), quoted in 42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi (1843).
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in
its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the
suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the
plaintiffs and defendants in the suit properly before it. But in such cases the decree
shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
Id.
70. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. OF CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 10–11 (2000).
In 1833, the first provision for group litigation in federal courts was set forth as
Equity Rule 48. This rule allowed for a representative suit when the parties on either
side were too numerous for convenient administration of the suit; unlike the Bill of
Peace, however, at first the outcomes of such group litigation were not binding on
similarly situated absent parties. Ten years later, in a case arising out of the pre-Civil
War tensions between North and South, the U.S. Supreme Court held that absent
parties could be bound by the outcomes of cases brought under Equity Rule 48.
Id. (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 11.
72. John G. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23—The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 705, 705
(1997) (citing JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 231 (1930)).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in the United States district
courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity . . . .”); FED.
R. CIV. P. 2 (“There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’”).
74. The original Rule 23 provided, in pertinent part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
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reform.”75 The class action categories reflected in original Rule 23 by
subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) were called “true,” “hybrid,”
and “spurious” class actions, respectively.76 In addition to the
differences in description,77 the three types differed both with respect
(1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that an owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do
or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 94–95 (1966).
75. Harkins, supra note 72, at 705–06.
The drafters understood that the rules which they would propose should be rules of
procedure only, not rules which would cause changes in substantive rights. In the
context of class actions, where the rights of those not before the court might be
affected, this principle had obvious importance. The result was said to be an attempt
to categorize the types of cases which might proceed as class actions, based on the
existing practice.
Id. at 705 (footnotes omitted).
76. See id. at 706–07 (“A categorization of acceptable classes—described in terms of the
character of the interests to be litigated—occurs in the three numbered paragraphs of
subdivision (a). . . . The three classes were described by Professor Moore as, respectively, a
‘true’ class, a ‘hybrid’ class and a ‘spurious’ class.”); see also Note, supra note 28, at 1321
(“The 1938 rule, which was understood to reflect Professor Moore’s famous distinctions
among ‘true,’ ‘hybrid,’ and ‘spurious’ class suits, proved to be a source of confusion almost
from its date of promulgation . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
In a “true” or (a)(1) class, the rights sought to be enforced were shared
rights—the “jural relationship”—and joinder of all members of the class would be
required to adjudicate those rights. The (a)(1) class action was thus a substitute for
mandatory joinder where the members of the class were so numerous as to make
such joinder impracticable. In the case of the “hybrid” or (a)(2) class, while the
rights of the class members might be several and not joint, those rights would relate
to some specific property, often a fund, over which the court would assume what
would be (or at least would be akin to) in rem jurisdiction. The jural relationship
would arise from the fact that the members of the class had “several” (rather than
joint) interests involving some distinct property and the interests of all of them with
respect to that property might be affected by the outcome of the litigation.
In the “spurious” class under (a)(3), if there was any “jural relationship,” it was
a fiction created to justify bringing together those who had no prior relationship
whatsoever. What would join the members of an (a)(3) class together was the
happenstance (and not a relationship) that determination of their “several” rights
would depend at least in part on resolution of a common question of law or fact,
and then only if it were further supposed that the members would seek common
relief. In this case, allowing the action to proceed as a class action would serve
(imperfectly) as a kind of permissive joinder mechanism by which strangers might
come together to litigate.
Harkins, supra note 72, at 707 (footnotes omitted).
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee note (1966 Amend.).
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to the parties’ ability to aggregate claims to satisfy the minimum
jurisdictional amount and with respect to the preclusive effect78 of
the judgment.79 Only “true” class actions—not “hybrid” or

It was thought that the definitions [in original Rule 23] accurately described the
situations amenable to the class-suit device, and also would indicate the proper
extent of the judgment in each category, which would in turn help to determine the
res judicata effect of the judgment if questioned in a later action. Thus the
judgments in “true” and “hybrid” class actions would extend to the class (although
in somewhat different ways); the judgment in a “spurious” class action would
extend only to the parties including intervenors.
Id.; Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 202, 207 n.30 (1969)
(“[B]ecause the categories of maintainable class actions in the old [Rule 23] were based on
whether the interests involved were ‘joint’ or ‘several,’ placement in a category also happened
to determine whether the claims could be aggregated. Aggregation was allowed in ‘true’ class
actions, but not in ‘hybrid’ or ‘spurious’ ones.”).
78. The class judgment in “spurious” class actions did not bind absent class members.
See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing claim aggregation and preclusive
effect of “true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious” class actions under original Rule 23). However, the
“spurious” class action’s lack of preclusive effect did not eliminate the necessity of adequate
representation. See Carroll v. Associated Musicians of Greater N.Y., 206 F. Supp. 462, 465,
470 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (describing the spurious class action as merely “a congeries of separate
suits,” but declining to find that the plaintiffs would “fairly insure adequate representation of
such class”); Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (noting that “[s]ince
a spurious class action is a form of permissive joinder device and binds only the original parties
and intervenors, the court does not need to make a searching inquiry into the adequacy of the
representation of the class,” but nevertheless concluding that because two plaintiffs’ interests
seemed antagonistic to the interests of other plaintiffs, adequate representation did not exist
and a spurious class action could not be maintained); Canuel v. Oskoian, 23 F.R.D. 307, 311
(D.R.I. 1959) (“Since the rights of non-appearing members of the plaintiff class cannot be
adjudicated herein, I am of the opinion that the named plaintiffs adequately represent the
plaintiff class and can be expected to prosecute vigorously the claims asserted in the
complaint.”).
79. The preclusive effect of class actions had been problematic even before the
promulgation of original Rule 23. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1751, at 15
(“Although the English practice was to treat a class-action judgment as binding on everyone in
the group, there was considerable uncertainty in the United States as to the res-judicata effect
on nonparty class members.”); id. at 16 (noting that Federal Equity Rule 48 seemed, by its
terms, to prohibit any preclusive effect, but “[n]onetheless, since one of the principal purposes
of allowing class suits was to prevent the multiplicity of actions involving common questions
and to obtain a final determination of the issues raised, this sentence occasionally was ignored
and the judgment was declared binding on all members of the group” (footnote omitted));
Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class
Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1163 (1998) (“[C]onsiderable uncertainty existed in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries over the preclusive effect of class actions. Sometimes
they were allowed to have such effect; sometimes they were not.” (footnote omitted)). This
uncertainty continued after original Rule 23 took effect. Id. (“This disarray continued even
after the codes took over the equity practice.”); see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical
Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1937 (1998) (“The
tripartite classification scheme adopted in [original] Rule 23 was based on Moore’s position
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“spurious” class actions—permitted the aggregation of claims to
meet the jurisdictional amount;80 absentees were bound by a class
judgment in “true” and “hybrid” class actions, but not in “spurious”
ones.81
Courts found the “true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious” categories
confusing,82 resulting in amendments to Rule 23 in 1966. The 1966
revisions to Rule 23 abandoned the previous labels, and instead
described the types of class actions in practical terms.83

that differences in the ‘jural relationships’ among class members required different treatment
and entailed different consequences so far as res judicata is concerned.” (footnote omitted));
id. at 1938–39 (“Although [original] Rule 23 did not discuss res judicata, Moore argued that
the binding effect of a class suit should depend on the category into which a suit was
subsumed. With ‘true’ and ‘hybrid’ class suits, he stated that absentee class members were
bound. . . . Both of these categories consisted of cases that, but for the class suit device, would
require joinder of absentees as necessary parties. With ‘spurious’ class suits, absentees were not
bound . . . . Most federal courts adopted Moore’s statements on res judicata . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
80. See Shapiro, supra note 30, at 377 (“In a true class action, in which the members of
the class unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common or undivided
interest, aggregation of their claims or interests is permissible for purposes of satisfying the
jurisdictional amount requirement, but in a suit which is merely a spurious or hybrid class
action, in which each class member’s claim or interest is separate and distinct from those
asserted by the others, such aggregation is not permissible.”).
81. See Note, supra note 77, at 207–08 (“Placement in a category [under original Rule
23] . . . determined the scope of the binding effect of the judgment.”); id. at 208 n.31 (“In
‘true’ class actions under old rule 23, all class members were bound by the judgment. In
‘hybrid’ actions, named parties were bound, and with respect to the property, the remaining
class members were also bound. In ‘spurious’ actions only the parties were bound.”).
82. See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1939), rev’d,
108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev’d, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), remanded to 39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.
Pa. 1941), rev’d sub nom. Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941)
(reflecting confusion as to which of the class action categories should apply); 39 F.R.D. 98
advisory committee’s note (1966) (describing the “true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious”
classifications as “obscure and uncertain,” and stating that “[t]he courts had considerable
difficulty with these terms”); see also Yeazell, supra note 64, at 696 n.41 (describing original
Rule 23’s categories as “a taxonomy that few professed to understand, and by which courts
confessed themselves baffled”); Note, supra note 28, at 1321 (noting that original Rule 23’s
categories “proved to be a source of confusion almost from its date of promulgation”).
83. Revised Rule 23 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
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Issues related to aggregation and preclusion84 in class actions
have remained, although those issues differ in nature from those
under original Rule 23. With respect to aggregation, the Supreme
Court held that class members could not aggregate their claims to
satisfy the jurisdictional amount.85 However, two recent
developments likely will diminish the need for aggregation in most
federal class action lawsuits—the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
which expressly authorizes aggregation when the amount in
controversy would thereby exceed $5 million,86 and the Supreme
Court’s 2005 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. decision,
which authorizes the use of supplemental jurisdiction in class
actions.87 With respect to preclusion, the 1966 revisions clarified the

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b).
84. See Hazard et al., supra note 79, at 1849 (noting that precedent on the issue of
preclusion in class actions historically has been “equivocal and confused, and . . . remains
somewhat so today”).
85. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (requiring the court to aggregate the claims of the
individual class members to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $5,000,000).
87. 545 U.S. 546, 546 (2005) (“[W]here the other elements of jurisdiction are present
and at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement,
§ 1367 does authorize supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same
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drafters’ intention that all class judgments have preclusive effect.88
Some limited preclusion issues have remained, however, most
notably regarding subsequent collateral attacks against class
judgments.89
Thus, from a historical perspective, class actions are more than
purely aggregate lawsuits. As explored in the next Part, the defining
characteristic of the class action—the feature most distinctive and
most compelling—is its representative nature. For this reason, to
shift to a focus on the aggregate deemphasizes, blurs, and softens the
critical central nature of the class action reality.
IV. “REPRESENTATIVE” VERSUS “AGGREGATE”: TERMINOLOGY IN
THE SUPREME COURT’S CLASS ACTION CASE LAW
In addition to the references to “representative” actions within
Rule 23 itself, the United States Supreme Court has regularly and
repeatedly invoked the “representative” nature of the device in
discussing class actions.90 In contrast, the phrase “aggregate
Article III case or controversy, even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount
specified in the statute setting forth the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.”).
88. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1261–62 (2002) (“[C]lass actions under the 1966 revision were
all meant to have full res judicata effect. The 1966 Rule drafters made perfectly clear—and for
the first time—that the entire point of the class action procedure was to adjudicate individual
claims in one proceeding with full binding effect on each and every class member.”).
89. See Bassett, supra note 5, at 936–37 (“As a representative action, a class action thus
serves to bind every class member, including similarly situated individuals who did not actually
participate in the class action lawsuit. However, unless those who actually participated in the
lawsuit were adequate representatives of all of the diverse interests within the purported class,
the class action judgment cannot be used to preclude a subsequent action involving the
inadequately represented interests.”); William V. Luneburg, The Opportunity To Be Heard and
the Doctrines of Preclusion: Federal Limits on State Law, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81, 114 (1986)
(“The constitutional mandate of an opportunity to be heard requires . . . disregard of the
preclusive effect of the judgment” when an absent class member has been inadequately
represented); Monaghan, supra note 79, at 1200 (“[N]on-party, nonresident class members
should remain free to challenge an otherwise preclusive class judgment on due process grounds
in a forum of their choosing.”); Wolff, supra note 46, at 803 (“It remains a matter of serious
dispute whether [a subsequent] court may recognize a full-scale collateral attack and set aside a
class judgment on adequacy grounds.”); Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack
for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 445 (2000) (“The
understanding that absent class members may collaterally attack a judgment based on
inadequate representation is deeply entrenched in the law.”).
90. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 306 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832, 834, 841, 846 (1999); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 808 (1985); American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 549–50 (1974);
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litigation,” as such, does not appear in any of the Court’s decisions.91
The aggregate nature of class actions—the bringing together of
numerous parties in one lawsuit for judicial economy—is certainly an
integral part of class actions as well as other multiple-claim devices.
Although the word “aggregate” (or “aggregation”) does appear in
some of the Court’s class action opinions, the Supreme Court has
not used “aggregate” as a class action descriptor.92 Instead, the
Supreme Court’s class action decisions referring to “aggregate” (or
“aggregation”) discuss either a sum total, such as the “aggregate
damages” involved,93 or the concept of aggregating claims for the
purpose of satisfying the minimum jurisdictional amount.94 This is
not to suggest that the Supreme Court neither notices nor cares
when a case involves numerous parties. My point, as explored below,
is that the Court has declined to emphasize the aggregate over the
representative in class actions, despite opportunities to do so.
In sharp contrast to the aggregate feature of class actions—
meaning that a class action folds numerous claims into a single
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72–73 (1939);
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921).
91. A search conducted on Westlaw using the Supreme Court (“SCT”) database and the
search term “aggregate litigation” yielded no cases. Searches of the federal district and circuit
court decisions fared little better. In the federal circuit court database (“CTA”), the search
term “aggregate litigation” yielded five cases, three of which are the same quote from In re
Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992). This quote appears in
this Article at note 196, infra. In the federal district court database (“DCT”), the search term
“aggregate litigation” yielded eight cases, five of which again involve this same quote. Of the
five cases remaining, one cites a law review article that has the term “aggregate litigation” in its
title, and the other four discuss a sum total, such as “aggregate litigation expenses.”
92. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 526 (1967). The
leading class action treatise similarly refers to “aggregate” in this sense:
After proof of the defendant’s liability to the class, the issue remains concerning a
determination of what damages or other relief class members are entitled to receive.
When a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief are sought, the class
representative traditionally will obtain this relief in the aggregate for the entire class
or, when appropriate, for particular subclasses that compose or are part of the entire
class. . . . There are occasions when it is feasible and reasonable to prove aggregate
monetary relief for the class . . . .
3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 10:1, at 476; see also id. § 10:2, at 477 (“[T]he
ultimate goal in class actions is to determine the aggregate sum, which fairly represents the
collective value of claims of individual class members.”).
94. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 571 (2005)
(discussing the Class Action Fairness Act); Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292, 295–
301 (1973), overruled on other grounds by Exxon Mobile Corp., 545 U.S. at 566; Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 334–35 (1969); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 88 (1939).
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lawsuit—the representative nature of class actions is both central to
the class action concept and rises to a constitutional dimension. As
the Supreme Court has noted, “selection of representatives for
purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily
or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to
represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties which
due process requires.”95
Again and again, the Supreme Court has emphasized adequate
representation as a due process prerequisite to a binding class
judgment. The classic adequate representation case is the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hansberry v. Lee, in which the Supreme Court
specifically equated adequacy of representation with due process, and
which allowed class actions only when adequate representation
existed.96 Hansberry considered Illinois state court practices.97 An
earlier Illinois case, Burke v. Kleiman, had successfully enforced a
racially restrictive covenant.98 Subsequently, Anna Lee and others
sought to enforce the same covenant against Carl Hansberry, an
African-American.99 Hansberry defended against Lee’s action by
arguing that the covenant never became effective because its terms
required, as a prerequisite, the signatures of ninety-five percent of
the landowners within the designated area and that the requisite
number of signatures had never been obtained.100 Lee pleaded that
this issue was precluded by the Burke judgment; Hansberry
countered that application of the preclusion doctrine against him
would violate due process.101
The Supreme Court, characterizing Burke as a class action, noted
that absent actually participating in an action or standing in privity
with one actually participating in an action, “members of a class . . .
may [only] be bound by the judgment where they are in fact
adequately represented by parties who are present . . . .”102 The

95. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45.
96. Id.; see Bassett, supra note 5, at 938 (“Hansberry was notable for equating adequacy
of representation with due process, thereby establishing adequacy as a prerequisite to a binding
class judgment.”).
97. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 36.
98. 277 Ill. App. 519, 520, 533–34 (1934).
99. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37–38.
100. Id. at 38.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 42–43.
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Court found that the purported class in Burke consisted of “dual and
potentially conflicting interests.”103 Due to these conflicts, adequate
representation did not exist, and thus the prior Burke action could
not bind Hansberry.104 To the Court, the representation issue
predominated over the aggregate aspects of the class action.105
Hansberry was pivotal in the history of class actions and was notable
for equating adequacy of representation with due process, thereby
establishing representativeness as a prerequisite to a binding class
judgment.
Since Hansberry v. Lee, the two most important class action
decisions to meaningfully address adequacy of representation106 are
the Court’s relatively recent opinions in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor107 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.108 In Amchem and Ortiz,
the Court again emphasized the importance of adequate
representation in class actions generally. In both cases, the Court
then went a step further by declining the opportunity to subordinate
adequate representation to the desirability of a class-wide settlement,
and thereby further established the preeminence of representation
over aggregation.
103. Id. at 44.
[A]ll those alleged to be bound by the [covenant] would not constitute a single class
in any litigation brought to enforce it. Those who sought to secure its benefits by
enforcing it could not be said to be in the same class with or represent those whose
interest was in resisting performance . . . .
Id.
104. Id. at 45–46.
105. See id. at 41–42, 44–46.
106. Other Supreme Court decisions have mentioned adequacy of representation, but
without much elaboration. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379
n.5 (1996) (noting that one of the briefs raised an adequacy of representation issue, but stating
that the issue was “outside the scope of the question presented in this Court”); Id. at 396, 399
(Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasizing “the centrality of the procedural due
process protection of adequate representation in class-action lawsuits, emphatically including
those resolved by settlement,” and noting that “[f]inal judgments . . . remain vulnerable to
collateral attack for failure to satisfy the adequate representation requirement”); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (reiterating the necessity of adequate
representation to due process and stating that “the Due Process Clause of course requires that
the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class
members”); Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 161 (1982) (noting the Court had
“repeatedly held that ‘a class representative must be part of the class and “possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury” as the class members,’” and noting the necessity of “a
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied”).
107. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
108. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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Amchem and Ortiz squarely, strikingly, and compellingly
presented the competing notions of representation and aggregation.
Both Amchem and Ortiz were asbestos class actions,109 described in
Ortiz as part of the “elephantine mass of asbestos cases,”110 and both
involved issues of adequate representation in a class-wide
settlement.111 If the Court had been inclined to do so, the claims in
Amchem and Ortiz presented the best possible circumstances for the
Court to shift its emphasis from a “representative” to an “aggregate”
focus.
Indeed, the dissents in both Amchem and Ortiz focused on the
“aggregate” nature of the asbestos litigation involved.112 Justice
Breyer’s separate opinion in Amchem, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, bluntly stated, “I believe that the need for
settlement in this mass tort case, with hundreds of thousands of
lawsuits, is greater than the Court’s opinion suggests.”113 Justice
Breyer again dissented in Ortiz, and again focused on the enormous
number of asbestos cases.114 The first sentence of his Ortiz dissent
noted that “[the] case involve[d] a settlement of an estimated
186,000 potential future asbestos claims against a single
company.”115 His dissent goes on to note that “[i]n the past decade

109. Id.; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597.
110. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821; see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598 (quoting Report of the
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 2-3 (Mar. 1991)), which states:
[This] is a tale of danger known in the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of
Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the
1960s, and a flood of lawsuits beginning in the 1970s. On the basis of past and
current filing data, and because of a latency period that may last as long as 40 years
for some asbestos related diseases, a continuing stream of claims can be expected.
The final toll of asbestos related injuries is unknown. Predictions have been made of
200,000 asbestos disease deaths before the year 2000 and as many as 265,000 by
the year 2015.
The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be briefly
summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long delays
are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated over and over;
transaction costs exceed the victims’ recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of
assets threatens and distorts the process; and future claimants may lose altogether.
Id.
111. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 830–31; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613.
112. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting); Ortiz, 527 U.S.
at 866–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
113. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting).
114. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 866–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 865.
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nearly 80,000 new federal asbestos cases have been filed; more than
10,000 new federal asbestos cases were filed last year,”116 and that
“asbestos cases on average take almost twice as long as other lawsuits
to resolve.”117 Clearly, “aggregate” concerns were squarely before
the Court.
The extraordinary number of potential asbestos claims, and the
ongoing nature of asbestos litigation, framed issues of the
“aggregate” persuasively. In both Amchem and Ortiz, a class
settlement hung in the balance—settlements which, if upheld, would
have disposed of thousands upon thousands of claims and which, if
undone, would have put those same thousands upon thousands of
claims back into the courts. The opportunity to reconstruct class
action reality with a focus on the aggregate was clearly and
compellingly presented. Yet the Court rejected both settlements—
and an aggregate focus—and came down decisively and
unequivocally in favor of a representative emphasis.
Amchem was a settlement class action—it was filed as such and
certified as such, with no intention to litigate the matter.118 The
Amchem settlement purported to encompass both present and future
claimants, but the Court stated that the diversity of interests within
the class required the use of subclasses.119 Finding that the proposed
class lacked adequacy of representation, the Court observed that the
so-called “global compromise” did not fairly represent the various
interests within the class.120
Similarly, in Ortiz, the Supreme Court insisted on the primacy of
the adequacy of representation inquiry121 and expressly rejected the
perceived overall fairness of the settlement’s terms as a substitute for
116. Id. at 866.
117. Id.
118. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 601–02 (“The class action thus instituted was not intended to
be litigated. Rather, within the space of a single day, . . . the settling parties . . . presented to
the District Court a complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement agreement, and a joint
motion for conditional class certification.”).
119. Id. at 626–28 (discussing subclasses).
120. Id.
121. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831–32.
[T]he District Court took no steps at the outset to ensure that the potentially
conflicting interests of easily identifiable categories of claimants be protected by
provisional certification of subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4), relying instead on its post
hoc findings at the fairness hearing that these subclasses in fact had been adequately
represented.
Id.
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adequate representation.122 In particular, the Ortiz Court
condemned the district and circuit courts’ “uncritical adoption . . .
of figures agreed upon by the parties.”123 The Court emphasized that
courts must “rigorous[ly] adhere[] to those provisions of the Rule
‘designed to protect absentees,’”124 and also noted that “the moment
of certification requires ‘heightene[d] attention’ . . . to the
justifications for binding the class members.”125 Thus, when
presented with a settlement, even one with seemingly desirable terms
that efficiently resolves many thousands of claims, a court must
nevertheless rigorously scrutinize whether the adequacy of
representation126 necessary to bind the absent class members has
been provided.127
Large-scale “aggregate litigation” may be possible and desirable
in many cases. But class actions are not merely large-scale “aggregate
litigation”—class actions are something more and something
different. The representative nature of class litigation renders class
actions distinctive, goes to the core of the purpose of class litigation,
and implicates constitutional due process concerns. Unfortunately,
however, as explored in the next Part, a number of recent proposals
in the legal commentary seek to reconstruct class action reality in a

122. Id. at 857–59, 863–64.
123. Id. at 848.
124. Id. at 849 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620).
125. Id.
126. Relying on the language of Rule 23(a), courts and commentators often ascribe the
burden of providing adequate representation to class counsel and class representatives. See 1
CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 3:21, at 408 (noting that, with respect to adequacy of
representation, “the representatives must not possess interests which are antagonistic to the
interests of the class,” and “the representatives’ counsel must be qualified, experienced, and
generally able to conduct the litigation”). However, the burdens of adequate representation,
while falling most directly on class counsel and the class representatives, are also shared by
defense counsel, the defendant, and the court. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant’s
Obligation To Ensure Adequate Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511
(2006).
127. See Alan B. Morrison, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A
Brief Reply to Professors Kahan and Silberman, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1998).
Far from being a nice addition if it is available, adequate representation, along with
notice and an opportunity to participate (and in some cases the right to opt out), are
the essential elements that legitimize the class action and entitle the defendant to
use a prior class judgment or settlement as a bar to future litigation by everyone who
is part of the certified class.
Id.
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manner that ignores the representative nature of class actions in favor
of an exclusively aggregate focus.
V. THE DRAWBACKS OF AN “AGGREGATE” FOCUS: PROPOSALS TO
CONSTRUCT A NEW CLASS ACTION REALITY
Despite the Supreme Court’s repeated emphasis on adequate
representation as essential to constitutional due process, and thus to
the validity of class judgments, there is a clear push in the legal
literature to undermine that concept. In light of some of the highly
publicized difficulties and issues in class action practice, it is not
surprising that legal commentators would offer proposals that
attempt to address these difficulties and issues. But the number of
prominent proposals that would reconstruct class action reality with
an aggregate foundation and focus—as a method of mere claim
disposal and at the expense of constitutional due process
safeguards—is remarkable, if not astonishing.
If evidence suggested that the “adequate representation”
prerequisite required such a high threshold that many potential class
members were being excluded from a class-wide remedy, perhaps
this would warrant an increased emphasis on the aggregate. But this
is not the case. Accordingly, a shift away from the representative
nature of class actions—a shift that would lower constitutional due
process protections—should require especially careful scrutiny before
recommendation. Yet precisely such a shift in approach and emphasis
appears frequently in the legal literature. For example, prominent
proposals have advocated (1) treating the class as an “entity client,”
(2) incorporating economic perspectives and administrative law
concepts to class action practice, and (3) sharply restricting the
availability of collateral attacks of class judgments. All of these
innovative proposals share a common net effect: to reconstruct the
class action reality with an aggregate foundation and focus. I
examine each of these examples in turn.
A. Example One: Class as an “Entity Client”
One proposal in the legal literature would recast class actions
using an “entity client” model. The notion of the class as an “entity
client” envisions the entity—meaning the class—“[as both] the
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litigant and the client.”128 Thus, the class itself becomes the lawyer’s
client, rather than the individuals who comprise the class. According
to its major proponent, under this entity approach, “the class (like
other litigating entities [such as trade unions, corporations,
municipalities and other governmental entities129]) is the client, and
its members should play a role not as clients themselves but as
representatives of the client.”130
[In an entity approach,] the broader social interests at stake need to
be recognized . . . , since the measure of efficiency and due process
does require a balancing of the interest of the individual against the
other social concerns that are affected. In this case, the [entity]
model seems preferable both for the administration of the civil
justice system and for the interests of litigants other than the
plaintiff class.131

Treating the class as the client eliminates several issues that
currently arise in class litigation. In the “class as client” model,
potential conflicts of interest among the class members are no longer
disqualifying and, in fact, are no longer relevant. Similarly, because
the class is the client, rather than the individuals comprising the class,
a large number of opt-outs is no longer a concern—because class
members would no longer be permitted to opt out of the class
litigation.132
By shifting the focus to the class as a whole, an entity client
approach to class actions adopts an aggregate foundation and
focus.133 Indeed, the entity client proposal would adversely affect two
128. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 919.
129. See id. at 921.
130. Id. at 940.
131. Id. at 933.
132. Id. at 918–19.
[T]he aggregation model . . . allow[s] individuals to achieve the benefits of pooling
resources against a common adversary. . . . [In the entity model,] the entity is the
litigant and the client. Moreover, in the situations in which class action treatment is
warranted, the individual who is a member of the class, for whatever purpose, is and
must remain a member of that class, and as a result must tie his fortunes to those of
the group with respect to the litigation, its progress, and its outcome.
Id.
133. Although Professor Shapiro draws a distinction between an entity model and an
aggregation model, the entity model ultimately emphasizes the bringing together of claims
(albeit as an entity) rather than emphasizing the due process, fiduciary, and agency concepts
that are central to the representative approach to class actions. See id. at 918–19
(distinguishing between the “aggregation” and “entity” models).

1446

BASSETT.MRO.DOC

1415]

1/20/2007 1:04:49 PM

Constructing Class Action Reality

of the “minimal procedural due process protections” required in
class actions:134 it would eliminate outright the right to opt out135
and it would limit the necessity of notice.136
The entity client proposal has far-reaching ramifications. In
addition to eliminating opt-outs and limiting notice requirements, an
entity approach would alter the application of the ethical rules to
class actions.137 Other consequences to jurisdiction138 and choice of
law139 would also appear to follow. In other words, an entity
approach to class actions would permit procedural streamlining, but
at the expense of limiting or even eliminating rights and options that
currently protect class members, including due process safeguards.140

134. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985).
135. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 957 (“[A]n absolute opt-out right in [(b)(3) classes]
would undermine the validity of class treatment itself [under an entity approach].”).
136. See id. at 936–37 (discussing notice under an entity approach).
If [the cost of notice is high], then the arguments for viewing the class as the litigant
militate in favor of more selective notice, so long as an adequately representative
group of the class (or of each potential subclass) is notified. . . . In the case of the
“small claim” class action, requiring notice to all those members whose whereabouts
are reasonably accessible seems even less sensible. The interest of the individual in
the case is relatively low, as is the corresponding likelihood that any member of the
class will wish to spend the time and energy to monitor the action or will object to
the very idea of class treatment. In these circumstances, to insist on the widest
possible notice is to use “due process” notions as a method of effectively defeating
the claim at the threshold and depriving the polity of any social value it might have.
It is far better to provide for sufficient notice to make a representative group aware
of the action, so that the opportunity to object either to certification or to the
progress or handling of the action is not lost, while keeping the cost of such notice
within manageable bounds.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
137. An “entity” approach appears in some of the class-action literature in the context of
conflict of interest concerns. See Bassett, supra note 5, at 975 n.232 (arguing against a “class as
entity” approach to conflicts of interest); Moore, supra note 32, at 1477 (proposing that
classes should be treated as entity clients for purposes of the ethical rules); see also Charles
Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating Settlement
Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1484–91 (1998) (discussing differences between treating class
members as a single unit rather than individuals for conflict of interest purposes).
138. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 13, 28–29 (1996) (discussing implications of treating the class as an entity in the areas of
subject-matter and personal jurisdiction).
139. See id. at 29 (discussing implications of treating the class as an entity for choice of
law considerations).
140. The entity client proposal is susceptible to some serious challenges even aside from
its aggregate focus. For example, each of the other entity-clients listed as analogous examples—
trade unions, corporations, municipalities, and other governmental entities—has an existence
and an organizational structure independent of litigation, whereas the class in a class action is
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In short, the entity client proposal shifts the focus from the
individual class members to the class as a whole, and in doing so,
distances the adequacy evaluation from the individual class members.
To assert that such an individual may be lumped together with
others against her will, with no right to opt out and limited rights to
notice—simply because it is more efficient—is indeed to reconstruct
class action reality away from a representative approach and toward a
view that values efficiency more than due process.
B. Example Two: Economic Perspectives and
Analogies to Administrative Proceedings
A second example of a recent attempt to reconstruct class action
reality involves proposals that have attempted to import
administrative law processes and law-and-economics approaches to
the class action arena.141 The recent popularity of law and
economics,142 and the application of economic principles to a broad
variety of topics in the legal literature,143 renders proposals for similar
extensions to the class action context unsurprising. Equally
unsurprising, in light of the centrality of efficiency to the wealth
maximization and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency concepts of law-andeconomics theory,144 such approaches would reconstruct class action
reality with an aggregate focus.
created for the sole and exclusive purpose of litigation. This reality, I would suggest, renders it
much more difficult to treat the class as an entity when there is no separate entity existence.
141. These proposals overlap with each other. Daphne Barak-Erez, The Administrative
Process as a Domain of Conflicting Interests, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 193, 199 (2005)
(“There is a growing tendency to consider administrative law in light of the economic and
social justifications of regulation.”). They also overlap with the previous “entity client”
example. See Silver & Baker, supra note 137, at 1465 (“From an economic perspective, [mass
actions and class actions] . . . resemble corporations.”).
142. See Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 433, 434 (“Law and economics has been one of the most successful innovations
in the legal academy in the last century.”).
143. See Jay S. Marks, An Economic Analysis of Agency Behavior, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 127, 139
(1991) (“Today, there are literally hundreds of articles applying economic analysis to the law in
numerous fields . . . .”).
144. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717, 779
(2005) (“[T]he normative premise . . . motivating law and economics scholarship . . . [is]
efficiency.”); Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido
Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 220, 224 (2005) (“[L]aw and economics [is] an approach to legal
reasoning grounded in efficiency concerns.”); Gary Minda, Reflections, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
2397, 2399 (2005) (noting “[t]he efficiency hypothesis of the law and economics
movement”); Paul H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP.
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One proposal brings both themes together to view class actions
“more along the lines of representation in other lawmaking
processes—the most closely analogous being that of administrative
agencies,”145 explaining that “the law may advance regulatory
objectives through the structuring and facilitation of markets.”146
This proposal then goes on to analogize administrative agencies to
class counsel,147 and to import administrative law and regulatory
policy to class actions.148
The time has come for a conception of the modern class action less
as a cousin of ordinary civil litigation and more as that device
actually operates today, as a rival regime of governance. . . . [I]n
parsing the process due to absent class members, the law should
draw upon the lessons that have emerged in the modern
administrative state and the regulatory enterprise that it oversees.149

This proposal acknowledges that under administrative law,
“[a]ffected persons are entitled as a matter of constitutional due
process to an individualized ‘opportunity to be heard’ in
adjudication but not in rulemaking.”150 However, the proposal

CT. ECON. REV. 19, 19 (2005) (“Efficiency is the key organizing principle behind law and
economics.”); see also Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325, 1330 (2006)
(“Unable to equate ‘efficiency’ or ‘wealth maximization’ with Pareto optimality, the standard
trick in the law and economics repertoire has been to devolve to the Kaldor-Hicks standard.”).
See generally Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 509, 509-15 (1980) (discussing wealth maximization and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
concepts).
145. Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 287, 292 (2003) [hereinafter Nagareda, Administering Adequacy]. Professor Nagareda’s
previous work has made similar arguments. See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle
and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003); Richard A. Nagareda,
Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1996) [hereinafter Nagareda,
Tort to Administration]. Professor Molot has also drawn an administrative law analogy to the
judicial review of class action settlements. See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a
New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 112 (2003). But see Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1015, 1025–32 (2001) (noting the shortcomings of administrative procedures and
arguing that negotiated rulemaking by agencies should draw upon the procedures of class
action law).
146. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 348.
147. Id. at 350–51.
148. Id. at 350–69.
149. Id. at 380.
150. Id. at 354 (citing United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244–45
(1973)).
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would deny an individualized opportunity to be heard in class
actions and would substitute a “reasoned explanation” for the
settlement reached,151 relying on “market discipline”152 to subject
defective settlements “to criticism by potential competitors within
the plaintiffs’ bar.”153
Determining the propriety of an administrative law analogy to
class actions requires an examination of the administrative law
process. Administrative proceedings differ significantly from
traditional litigation in a number of respects, all of which are less
protective of individual rights154—including less restrictive
evidentiary rules, the absence of an Article III judge, in some
instances the absence of counsel, and, most relevant to this article,
lessened due process protections.155 As one commentator recently
explained, “administrative decision-making should be understood as
devoted to balancing between conflicting interests of individuals or
groups, usually when none of the affected parties has predefined legal
rights that are relevant to the substantial content of the
administrative decision.”156 However, the reason for the filing of a
class action is precisely because the class members have predefined,
but as yet undetermined, legal rights: the class members already
possess a property right, and the class action serves as the process for

151. Id. at 359.
152. Id. at 365.
153. Id. at 363.
154. See John G. White, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy in
Action, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 239 (2001) (noting, with respect to administrative
proceedings, the “highly expedited nature of administrative proceedings,” the “relative lack of
formal due process,” and the “relative difficulty in assessing complex factual questions”)
(quoting Raj Vasant Pandit v. Vishal Bhuta, DeC, No. AF-0224 (July 10, 2000), available at
http://www.disputes.org/decisions/0224.htm). See generally Rex R. Perschbacher,
Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of Administrative Determinations
in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 422, 452–55 (1983) (noting the informality of
administrative proceedings).
155. See Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 380 (“[I]n parsing the
process due to absent class members, the law should draw upon the lessons that have emerged
in the modern administrative state and the regulatory enterprises that it oversees.”).
156. Barak-Erez, supra note 141, at 193 (emphasis added). Barak-Erez provides examples
of appropriate regulations and regulatory decisions, including acceptable levels of pollution and
the allocation of educational resources, such as the number of students per classroom. Id. at
194–95. But see ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM (1968) (arguing that
the definition of the common good is not necessarily an aggregation of individual preferences);
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1511 (1992) (same).
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securing the remedy to which they legally are entitled (or
determining they have none).
The task of balancing between conflicting interests is characteristic
of the legislative process. Legislation is a process aimed at balancing
between the interests of various groups. No one can claim a right
to the legislation of a statute favorable to his or her interests. In
contrast, the judicial process is based on the premise that the court
has to decide on the proper application of a legal right to the facts
of the case. In so doing, the court takes into consideration
competing social interests, but the underlying assumption is that
rights, and not only interests, govern the decision . . . .
With this in mind, the resemblance of the administrative
regulatory process to the legislative process becomes evident. Both
processes are aimed at balancing between conflicting interests, and
both are clearly distributive.157

The analogy of class actions to administrative proceedings does
fit, but only in a narrow set of circumstances. Most commonly, after
the conclusion of traditional litigation to establish liability, some
courts have employed procedures resembling administrative
proceedings—such as individualized claim hearings—to determine
individualized remedies.158 And a few distinctive class action
settlements have proposed what has been described as “a private
administrative compensation scheme—a kind of miniature
administrative agency, if you will.”159 However, one of the cases cited
for this proposition160 was the lower court decision in what
ultimately became Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,161 in which the
Supreme Court ultimately rejected the proposed settlement for lack

157. Barak-Erez, supra note 141, at 195–96 (footnotes omitted).
158. See, e.g., Kraszewski v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. C-70-1261 TEH,
1986 WL 11746, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 1986) (“After a bifurcated trial on liability, . . . this
court found defendants liable under Title VII for sex discrimination on a class-wide basis.
Now, at Stage II of the proceedings, the court must determine the appropriate relief to
compensate the plaintiff class members.”); id. at *3 (“[T]he court hereby orders individual
hearings for the Stage II proceedings in this case.”).
159. Nagareda, Tort to Administration, supra note 145, at 921.
160. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246 (D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610
(3d Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see Nagareda, Tort to Administration, supra note
145, at 921 n.83.
161. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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of adequate representation.162 Thus, from the Supreme Court’s
perspective and from a representative focus, the administrative law
analogy is of a more limited utility than some scholars seem to
suggest. To extend this narrow analogy to the infinitely broader area
of adequate representation—the sine qua non of the representative
nature of class actions—is to substitute an aggregate focus.
Analogizing class actions to administrative proceedings is a
reconstruction of class action reality, and one with an indisputably
“aggregate” focus. “In the most general terms, the rationale
underlying the existence and operation of administrative agencies is
that they serve the so-called ‘public interest.’ This public interest is,
however, an aggregation of interests of individuals and groups that
form society.”163 Indeed, “[t]he aggregation of interests has
sometimes been considered a primary purpose of administrative
law.”164 Thus, under an administrative model, the purpose of class
actions would shift from a goal of according appropriate relief to
each class member, to instead reaching a decision that is merely
distributive by balancing among the conflicting interests of the class
as a whole. The reconstruction is more dramatic than it might
initially appear. The Supreme Court has previously noted that, for
absent class members, adequate representation substitutes for the
class member’s “day in court.”165 This “day in court” approach is
reflected in the Court’s approach to the collateral attack of a class
judgment, whereby a class member who was inadequately
represented will not be bound by the class judgment.166 To
reconstruct class action reality using an administrative law model
would treat the conglomerate class as a whole, thereby substituting a
“good enough” or “close enough” perspective for adequate
representation—deeming a resolution sufficient so long as overall,
rather than individual, fairness was achieved.

162. Id. at 625.
163. Barak-Erez, supra note 141, at 197.
164. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1331 (1997) (citing Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (1975)).
165. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (quoting 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 14, § 4449), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108,
105 Stat. 1071, 1076–77 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)).
166. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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C. Example Three: Limiting Collateral Attacks
Against Class Judgments

The third example of a recent attempt to reconstruct class action
reality involves proposals to limit collateral attacks against class
judgments. The calls to limit collateral attacks on class judgments
undermine the importance of the class action’s representative nature
by overemphasizing the aggregate element and raising attendant
dangers.
A collateral attack is “[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding
other than a direct appeal; [especially] an attempt to undermine a
judgment through a judicial proceeding in which the ground of the
proceeding (or a defense in the proceeding) is that the judgment is
ineffective.”167 Since a class judgment ordinarily will bind all class
members to that result,168 the ability to collaterally attack a class
action judgment largely depends on whether the challenger’s
interests were adequately represented in the first lawsuit.169 The
Supreme Court has assured the availability of a collateral attack to

167. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 278.
168. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42–43 (“It is familiar doctrine in the federal courts that
members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment
where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present . . . .”); Graham C.
Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as an Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV.
1008, 1009 (2003) (“American law generally holds that when a properly structured class
action is resolved by a judicial judgment, the entire class is bound.”); see also id. at 1019
(“[T]hroughout the history of the modern class action in the United States, the Supreme
Court has accepted the binding effect of the class judgment on absentees.”). See generally 18A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4455, at 448 (“Preclusion by representation lies at the heart
of the modern class action developed by such procedural rules as Civil Rule 23. The central
purpose of each of the various forms of class action is to establish a judgment that will bind not
only the representative parties but also all nonparticipating members of the class certified by
the court.”).
169. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (“Final judgments . . . remain vulnerable to collateral attack for
failure to satisfy the adequate representation requirement.”); see also 18A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 14, § 4455, at 448 (“The most important requirement of preclusion is that the
named parties afford adequate representation.”). Lilly similarly notes,
[T]he basic constitutional principle has been to permit unnamed class members to
challenge the adequacy of their representation in a collateral trial. If the court finds
that the class (or certain members within it) was inadequately represented, the
judgment as to the class (or individual within it) will be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause.
Lilly, supra note 168, at 1037 (citations omitted).
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safeguard due process for absent class members for more than sixtyfive years—ever since Hansberry v. Lee.170
Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.171 provides an example of a
collateral attack against a class action judgment—specifically, the
class action settlement in In re “Agent Orange” Products Liability
Litigation.172 In Agent Orange, the court took an aggregate
approach, certifying a class that included those who served in the
military “from 1961 to 1972 who were injured while in or near
Vietnam by exposure to ‘Agent Orange’” as well as their families.173
The court-approved settlement in Agent Orange provided that the
defendants would create a $180 million settlement fund.174 Threequarters of the fund monies were distributed directly “to exposed
veterans who suffer[ed] from long-term total disabilities and to the
surviving spouses or children of exposed veterans who have died.”175
The remaining one-quarter of the fund monies was allocated
primarily to the “Agent Orange Class Assistance Program,” aimed at
providing grants to agencies serving Vietnam veterans and their
families.176 After these allocations, $10 million remained as a reserve
for future claims.177
The Agent Orange settlement expressly stated that the class
“specifically includes persons who have not yet manifested injury,”178

170. 311 U.S. at 41–42.
171. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d by an equally
divided Court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam).
172. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980),
modified, 597 F. Supp. 740, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
173. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
174. See id. app. A, at 863.
175. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 253.
176. Id.; see also Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig.), 611
F. Supp. 1396, 1432 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d in part, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
that the priorities of the Agent Orange Class Assistance Program included “the establishment
of legal and social service projects to benefit Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange and
suffering some disability and their families,” and that the first funding priority should be
“[c]hildren with birth defects born to class member veterans”).
177. See In re “Agent Orange,” 597 F. Supp. at 870 app. B (stating, in the class action
settlement notice, that a portion of the settlement fund “will be set aside for future payment to
those class members who have not, as yet, manifested adverse health effects but who may
manifest such effects in the future”); see also Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 252 (“The settlement
provided that defendants would pay $180 million into a settlement fund, $10 million of which
would indemnify defendants against future state court actions alleging the same claims.”).
178. In re “Agent Orange,” 597 F. Supp. app. A, at 865.
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yet set aside only $10 million to pay such claims. This $10 million
was subsequently transferred to the “Agent Orange Class Assistance
Program” rather than kept as a reserve for future claimants.179
Moreover, the settlement “only provided for recovery for those
whose death or disability was discovered prior to 1994. . . . No
provision was made for post-1994 claimants, and the settlement fund
was permitted to terminate in 1994.”180 In a challenge to the Agent
Orange settlement filed before the expiration of the settlement fund,
the court justified the 1994 cutoff by noting that “[t]he relevant
latency periods and the age of the veterans ensure that almost all
valid claims will be revealed before that time.”181
Future claimants were not a separate subclass in the Agent
Orange case; indeed, there were no subclasses of any type.182 The
adequacy of representation issue is obvious; the expectation of fewer
claims after 1994 would justify maintaining a smaller post-1994
reserve, rather than eliminating the reserve altogether.183 Having
been intentionally and specifically swept within the class settlement,
the future claimants who became ill after 1994 had the right to
adequate representation.184 But by approaching the Agent Orange
class action from a purely aggregate perspective, both the litigants
and the court were focused on disposing of the claims—a focus
which, as in Amchem, came at the expense of neglecting the key
requirement of adequate representation.

179. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1820 n.193.
180. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 260–61; see also id. at 253 (noting that no payments for
“death or disability occurring after December 31, 1994” were permitted under the settlement
(citing In re “Agent Orange,” 611 F. Supp. at 1417).
181. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 781 F. Supp. 902, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
182. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 252, 259–60.
183. In a subsequent law review article, Judge Weinstein, the district court judge who
approved the Agent Orange settlement, stated his belief that the claims in the Agent Orange
lawsuit lacked merit. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 469, 543 (1994) (stating that, with respect to the Agent Orange litigation, “the
law and science, in my view, did not support a viable cause of action”). Professor Koniak has
opined that if the court believed the claims lacked merit, the proper result would have been to
dismiss the entire lawsuit; a belief that the claims lacked merit would not excuse or justify
inadequate representation. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1826 n.217, 1826–28.
184. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1821 (“[I]f the post-1994s . . . had been adequately
represented, this deal would have provided something of substance for them—or their lawyer
would have insisted that they be left out of it altogether. Put another way, such blatant bias for
the presents, the near-futures and the non-injured—at the expense of people like Stephenson—
demonstrates that Stephenson was not adequately represented.”).
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Enter Daniel Stephenson, who was exposed to Agent Orange
during his tour of duty in Vietnam, but who was not diagnosed with
cancer from that exposure until 1998—after the 1994 termination of
the settlement fund.185 Stephenson sued the manufacturers of Agent
Orange, who argued that the Agent Orange settlement precluded
Stephenson’s suit. Although the district court dismissed
Stephenson’s suit,186 the Second Circuit concluded that Stephenson
had been denied adequate representation and thus had been denied
due process187—a result affirmed when the Supreme Court split by a
4-4 vote.188
The legal literature reflects a rich debate over the propriety of
collaterally attacking a class judgment as a general matter189 and of

185. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 255 (noting that Stephenson “served in Vietnam from
1965 to 1970, serving both on the ground in Vietnam and as a helicopter pilot in
Vietnam. . . . On February 19, 1998, he was diagnosed with multiple myeloma . . . .”); see also
Koniak, supra note 15, at 1818 (“In 1998, Stephenson was diagnosed with multiple myeloma,
a deadly cancer that some studies connect to Agent Orange exposure.”).
186. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 251 (vacating “the district court’s dismissal”).
187. Id. at 261 (“Because these plaintiffs were inadequately represented in the prior
litigation, they were not proper parties and cannot be bound by the settlement.”).
188. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam).
189. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Finality of Judgments in Class Actions: A Comment on
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1163–64 (1998) (criticizing the suggestion
that class members should be able to attack adequacy of counsel collaterally); Marcel Kahan &
Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving
Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 262–66 (“[A]dequacy of representation
should be raised directly, and not be permitted to be raised collaterally” when class members
had a “fair opportunity to raise the issue.”); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate
Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
765, 779–83 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Silberman, Inadequate Search] (criticizing broad
right to mount collateral attack upon adequacy of representation); Marcel Kahan & Linda
Silberman, The Proper Role for Collateral Attack in Class Actions: A Reply to Allen, Miller, and
Morrison, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1193 (1998) (responding to previous articles regarding the
ability to collaterally attack a class judgment by arguing that those positions are inconsistent
with the language and effect of existing case law); Geoffrey P. Miller, Full Faith and Credit to
Settlements in Overlapping Class Actions: A Reply to Professors Kahan and Silberman, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (1998) (calling for counsel “to establish a full record on adequacy
in the fairness hearing”); Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 366 (stating
that he “share[s the] inclination” of commentators who have called for limits on the ability to
collaterally attack class judgments); Kevin R. Bernier, Note, The Inadequacy of the Broad
Collateral Attack: Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Company and Its Effect on Class Action
Settlements, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1023 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt a
limited standard for collateral attacks against class judgments). But see Koniak, supra note 15,
at 1794 (“Those who argue against an unfettered right of absentees to mount a collateral
attack based on inadequacy of representation bemoan the lack of finality to class action
settlements that right creates. Due process is, however, always in tension with efficiency, speed
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Daniel Stephenson’s collateral attack specifically.190 Indeed, this
debate has drawn a number of influential voices, many of whom urge
an aggregate-oriented outcome, albeit through different approaches.
Some prominent voices within this debate assert that the trial
court necessarily determines the existence (or lack) of adequate
representation as part of the class suit, and thus any challenges to the
trial court’s adequacy of representation determination should be
limited to direct appeal.191 In other words, advocates of this approach
contend that since absent class members conceivably could have
shown up to contest adequacy of representation during the trial
court hearing, their failure to do so should preclude any collateral
challenge.
It is perhaps hard to imagine an argument any more diametrically
opposed to the idea of the representative nature of class actions than
the one proffered in the preceding paragraph, and this territory has
been fiercely contested.192 In particular, the notion that absent class

and finality.”); Monaghan, supra note 79, at 1200 (supporting the right to collaterally attack
class judgments based on inadequate representation); Woolley, supra note 89, at 433–38
(arguing that the ability to mount a collateral attack on a judgment is an important safeguard
to ensure that class members receive a hearing on the merits of a case).
190. See, e.g., Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 316–20 (criticizing
the Second Circuit’s decision in Stephenson and characterizing the Supreme Court’s deadlock
as a “missed opportunity”); Bernier, supra note 189, at 1024 (arguing that by deadlocking in
Stephenson, the Supreme Court “missed an opportunity” and should adopt a limited standard
for collateral attacks against class judgments).
191. See, e.g., Kahan & Silberman, Inadequate Search, supra note 189, at 782–86, 788–
89 (contending that collateral attacks should not be permitted to challenge the adequacy of
representation if the original forum made a finding of adequacy based on appropriate
procedures). Other commentators have explored the shortcomings of this approach in detail.
See Woolley, supra note 89, at 390–422 (refuting the arguments of Professors Kahan and
Silberman).
192. Commentators have explored the shortcomings of this approach in detail. See
Woolley, supra note 89, at 383, 390–422 (refuting the arguments of Professors Kahan and
Silberman); see also id. at 397 (observing that to require absent class members to raise adequacy
objections in the class suit itself “would be inconsistent with the representative nature of class
suits, a fact underlined by the lack of authority for such an approach under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23”). For example, Professor Koniak notes:
[A]t its core, [Professors Kahan and Silberman’s argument is] a form of waiver
argument. You chose not to object; you have waived your chance to contest
adequacy. And for that reason it is disingenuous at its core: absent class members are
not supposed to all show up and contest matters. Notices, in fact, make clear that
staying away is a perfectly appropriate response. Having invited passivity, indeed
depending upon just such passivity, what kind of legal system would then penalize
it? Not one committed to “due process.”
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members must challenge adequacy of representation at the fairness
hearing or in a direct appeal is undermined by language from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, which
expressly states that due to the very representative nature of class
actions, absent class members are “not required to do anything.”193
Rule 23 itself, through the responsibilities imposed on the class
representative, similarly undermines the argument that absent class
members must participate in either the fairness hearing or a direct
appeal in order to challenge adequacy of representation.194 Thus, the
suggestion that absent class members must raise any adequacy
challenge in the initial proceedings or on direct appeal is inconsistent
with the understanding of both Rule 23 and the case law regarding

Koniak, supra note 15, at 1851. Other relatively recent Supreme Court decisions also suggest
the continued vitality of collateral attacks against class judgments. See Richards v. Jefferson
County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (permitting a collateral attack in a taxpayer class action where
the challengers were not adequately represented in the first lawsuit); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755, 762–63 (1989) (rejecting the contention that a collateral attack was not permitted
because the challengers had failed to intervene in the initial proceedings), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1074, 1076–77. The
Supreme Court recently held that an unnamed class member who objected at the fairness
hearing should be considered a “party” for purposes of appealing the court’s approval of the
settlement. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7, 10 (2002). However, the Court cast Devlin
very narrowly and the case would appear to deal only with direct appeals, adding nothing to
arguments concerning the ability of an unnamed class member to launch a collateral attack. See
id. at 15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating conclusion in narrow terms); see also Koniak, supra note
15, at 1856–57 (concluding that Devlin should be read narrowly).
193. 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) (“[A]bsent plaintiff class members . . . need not hire
counsel or appear. . . . [A]n absent class-action plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may
sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards
provided for his protection.”). In a related context, the Supreme Court has held that the
failure to intervene cannot prohibit a collateral attack. See Martin, 490 U.S. at 763 (1989)
(“[A] party seeking a judgment binding on another cannot obligate that person to intervene
. . . .”).
194. See Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 76 (5th Cir. 1973).
The purpose of Rule 23 would be subverted by requiring a class member who learns
of a pending suit involving a class of which he is a part to monitor that litigation to
make certain that his interests are being protected; this is not his responsibility—it is
the responsibility of the class representative to protect the interests of all class
members.
Id.; see also Woolley, supra note 89, at 432 (“[V]irtually all avenues for precluding or limiting
absent class members from collaterally attacking a judgment are foreclosed by the
Constitution[;] . . . current class action rules impose no . . . obligation [upon absent class
members to intervene if they wish to object to inadequate representation, and instead] permit
all absent class members to collaterally attack a judgment for inadequate representation, even if
they could have raised their objection in the class proceedings.”).
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the role and responsibilities of absent class members and with the
fundamental representative nature of class actions.195
Another voice in the commentary posits that any challenges to
adequacy of representation must be founded in information known
at the time of the class judgment—meaning that collateral attacks
based on post-judgment information, such as Stephenson’s illness
after expiration of the Agent Orange settlement fund, should not be
permitted.196 This argument, too, has been vigorously criticized.197
As Professor Koniak has observed:
If the defendant wanted to be released from all liability to those
who might get sick after 1994, those claims were worth
something—and that something belonged to anyone who got sick
after 1994. To have one lawyer who represents everyone in the
class agree to transfer the value of the post-1994 releases to those
who got sick before 1994 is to accept a lawyer operating with a
conflict that actually adversely affects a segment of the class. If the
post-1994 claims were worthless, the defendant should have been
willing to exempt those claims from the class settlement. A lawyer
adequately representing the post-1994 interests would have
demanded something for the release from liability or demanded any
such claims be excised from the class settlement.198

195. See Woolley, supra note 89, at 394 (“[C]lass action rules and statutes do not require
absent class members to raise adequacy objections in the class suit itself. Thus, absent class
members may collaterally attack a judgment based on inadequate representation.”).
196. See Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 297 (“[T]he interests of
class members may be aligned, if at all, only prejudgment, not postjudgment. Divergence of
interest within the class that emerges only postjudgment—that does not preexist the class—
cannot serve as a basis on which to deny preclusive effect to a class judgment, else the law
would make finality well nigh impossible to achieve in any class settlement.”).
197. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1822 n.198 (discussing problems raised by Professor
Nagareda’s approach).
198. Id. The theoretical basis for the use of only pre-judgment information relies on an
analogy of class actions to administrative proceedings. The commentator advocating this
approach acknowledges that his “crucial insight . . . that the interests of class members may be
aligned, if at all, only prejudgment, not postjudgment” is not an insight shared by the Supreme
Court. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 297 (stating that this insight
“eluded the Court in Hansberry and . . . continues to elude the law to present day”). Professor
Nagareda criticizes “three ill-chosen words in Shutts”—the Court’s reference to the Due
Process Clause as requiring adequate representation of absent class members’ interests “at all
times”—as “hav[ing] led astray an entire line of academic commentary on adequate class
representation.” Id. Interestingly, Professor Nagareda’s own argument is subject to precisely
the same criticism, because his proposal is based on an isolated phrase in Shutts—identified as a
quote from Moore’s Federal Practice treatise—stating that a class action can resemble a “quasiadministrative proceeding,” but providing no further comment, explanation, endorsement, or
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The arguments proffered in favor of limiting collateral attacks
uniformly include the aggregate-oriented goal of finality of
judgments and the impact of the ability to collaterally attack a class
judgment upon class action settlements—and a necessarily
concomitant discounting of the constitutionally-mandated due
process prerequisite of adequate representation.199
Those seeking to limit the ability of absent class members to
collaterally attack a class judgment argue that, in effect, other
aggregate-oriented
considerations—judicial
economy,
court
congestion, the promotion of settlements, and the desirability of
finality—should outweigh the adequate representation of absent class
members.200 These arguments, of course, are consistent with the view
of class actions as mere “aggregate litigation,” with a focus on
disposing of numerous claims in an expedient manner, and are
inconsistent with a representative focus.201
The emphasis on the aggregate in these recent proposals is more
than just a shift in emphasis; it presages a reconstruction of class
action reality. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected an
aggregate approach to class actions (as contrasted with a

edification. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809 (quoting 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.45 (1984)). Nearly 40 years ago, in discussing an opt-in procedure
for class actions, a law review article posited a narrow analogy between class actions and
administrative proceedings, but importantly, drew this analogy only with respect to certain
types of class actions—and did not attempt to generalize such a notion to class actions as a
whole. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98 (1967) (Expressing
concern that an opt-in procedure “would result in freezing out the claims of people—especially
small claims held by small people—who for one reason or another, ignorance, timidity,
unfamiliarity with business or legal matters, will simply not take the affirmative step. . . . For
them the class action serves something like the function of an administrative proceeding where
scattered individual interests are represented by the Government.”).
199. See Sara Maurer, Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson: Class Action Catch 22, 55 S.C.
L. REV. 467, 480 (2004) (“Efficiency and judicial administration are not served when any class
member can question the finality of a judgment. Also, defendants will be less likely to settle if
there exists the possibility that the settlement will not end the litigation with finality.”).
200. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1794.
201. The volume—in terms of both number and intensity—of the reaction against
collateral attacks of class judgments is curious in light of its relative rarity. See Koniak, supra
note 15, at 1857 (“[T]here is no evidence whatsoever that absent class members are clogging
the courts with collateral attacks anywhere. And they never have.”); Mollie A. Murphy, The
Intersystem Class Settlement: Of Comity, Consent, and Collusion, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 469
(1999) (“Collateral attack has been used relatively sparingly to attack . . . adequacy of
representation . . . .”); Woolley, supra note 89, at 443 (“Notwithstanding the longstanding
availability of collateral attack, such attacks have not been common . . . .”).
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representative approach) and has instead repeatedly insisted on the
adequate representation of absent class members at the expense of
global settlements and court dockets. An emphasis on the aggregate
distorts the viewing lens. Judicial economy, resolution, and finality
are laudable goals as a general matter. But when the impetus to
dispose of the aggregated claims becomes the focus, “tunnel vision”
almost necessarily results, leading to the neglect of claimants’
interests and the denial of due process. Imposing limits on the ability
to collaterally attack a class judgment means removing the safeguard
for someone who was not provided adequate representation—and
binding her to a judgment even when rendered as the result of
proceedings that denied her constitutional due process and basic
fairness.
D. Conclusion: The Hazards of Reconstructing Class Action Reality
with an “Aggregate” Foundation and Focus
Influential voices have proposed to reconstruct our image of class
actions to focus on the aggregate nature of class actions, with a
concomitant emphasis on clearing court dockets, reaching global
settlements, and limiting collateral attacks on class judgments.202
Such an approach employs a constricted view of class actions as
simply one means of disposing of a large number of claims—indeed,
as merely “aggregate” litigation.203 Unfortunately, however, viewing
class actions merely as “aggregate litigation” interjects genuine
dangers into class litigation—including truncated court review and
oversight of class settlements, diminished attention to adequate
representation as a general matter, and ultimately, an increased risk
that class members are denied constitutional due process and basic
fairness, which raises the possibility of more collateral attacks.
Why would commentators propose a reconstruction of class
action reality that adopts an aggregate foundation and focus? One
reason is that this aggregate focus is part of a larger trend. The trend
toward viewing the primary goal of the class action as claim
disposal—the aggregate view of efficiency—is also seen in the law
202. See supra notes 128–140, 145–53, 163–166, 191, 196, 200–201 and accompanying
text (providing examples).
203. An undue emphasis on the expeditious disposal of claims has ramifications beyond
the class action context. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84
B.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (arguing that the attempts “to streamline and expedite litigation . . .
are drastically obscuring and reducing both the visibility and the application of legal norms”).
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more generally and broadly. Indeed, the notion of “dispute
resolution” is often seen as the primary focus of, and perhaps even a
synonym for, law itself.204 Accordingly, a similar emphasis on the
efficiency of the class action device—the inherent ability of a class
action to dispose of numerous claims within a single proceeding—
perhaps should come as no surprise. However, treating law and
litigation generally, and treating class actions specifically, as mere
mechanisms for “dispute resolution” is an erroneous, harmful, and
simplistic approach, permitting other purposes and goals to be
disregarded and discarded.205 The courts already face an inherent
temptation to treat class actions in an aggregate manner,206 and such
an aggregate approach often lies behind court approvals of class
settlements without rigorous scrutiny. As the Second Circuit has
warned, “The systemic urge to aggregate litigation must not be
allowed to trump our dedication to individual justice, and we must
take care that each individual plaintiff’s—and defendant’s—cause not
be lost in the shadow of a towering mass of litigation.”207
Another potential reason motivating these recent proposals
appears to be undue deference to defendants. For example, proposals
to limit the ability to collaterally attack a class judgment routinely
claim that without such restrictions, defendants will refuse to settle.
Certainly the adequate representation prerequisite creates additional
burdens for both litigation and settlement, and thus can hinder
prompt settlement in some cases. However, the adequate
representation prerequisite is not aimed at streamlining settlements;
it is intended to ensure due process. Moreover, it is not self-evident
that defendants will decline to settle absent prohibitions against
collateral attack. Not only are collateral attacks against class
judgments uncommon,208 but class judgments do not “capture” all
potential class members in any event, due to the ability of class

204. Id. at 13–14.
205. See id.
206. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1062 (2002) (noting
that full dockets, combined with judicial resources required of class actions and praise judges
receive for concluding cases quickly, conspire to “suppress[] judicial scrutiny of proposed [class
action] settlements”).
207. In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 853 (2d Cir. 1992).
208. See supra note 201 (discussing the rarity of collateral attacks against class
judgments).
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members to “opt out” of most class actions.209 The rule-mandated
ability to opt out has not prevented defendants from entering into
settlement agreements over the past four decades, and the rare
collateral attack seems similarly unlikely to impede settlements.
In effect, recent commentary has tended to use one component
of the aggregate construct to justify the other aggregate component.
The aggregate nature of class actions presents two underlying
concerns—numbers (“numerous” parties) and judicial economy.
Recent commentary has used the numbers concern as the means to
an end—as a justification for proposing measures with a judicial
economy focus. But this emphasis on judicial economy has
overshadowed the more compelling argument: the argument that
the aggregate nature of class actions—meaning the presence of
numerous parties—is the reason why adequate representation
matters. Precisely because a class action involves numerous parties,
representation issues are more challenging and adequate
representation is more difficult to achieve. The emphasis on judicial
economy glosses over the more interesting, more challenging, and
constitutionally-based problem of achieving adequate representation
in the context of numerous parties.
Reconstructing the class action reality as one of mere “aggregate
litigation,” with single-minded goals of clearing court dockets and
reaching global settlements, can lead judges to approve settlements
too readily, relying on counsel’s assertions regarding the settlement’s
desirability instead of undertaking close examination and scrutiny.210
An aggregate focus will almost inevitably curtail the adequacy of the
representation in the eager quest for resolution.211 One prominent
example involved Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, in which
attorneys filed, and the district court approved, a class action seeking
a global settlement of all current and future asbestos-related claims

209. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring that the individual notice in (b)(3) class
actions state, among other things, “that the court will exclude from the class any member who
requests exclusion”).
210. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999) (reproaching the
lower courts’ “uncritical adoption . . . of figures agreed upon by the parties”).
211. Professor Koniak has chronicled some of the problems arising in this area. See, e.g.,
Koniak, supra note 15, at 1800–36 (discussing Epstein, BancBoston, and Stephenson cases); see
also Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1056 (1995) [hereinafter Koniak, Widow Weeps] (discussing Amchem
case).
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for twenty manufacturers of asbestos products.212 As Professor
Koniak has so powerfully described,213 the lawyers involved in the
settlement—both class counsel and defense counsel—crafted two
deals. One deal was the global settlement for which they sought
court approval in the Amchem case; the other deal involved preexisting clients—the clients whom class counsel and others were
representing at the time defense counsel approached them about a
global settlement. The two deals had different terms, and the preexisting clients received the better deal.214 Adequate representation,
of course, is a prerequisite to maintaining a class action, even one
initially filed as a settlement class action215—yet class counsel and

212. 521 U.S. 591, 597, 601–02 (1997).
213. See generally Koniak, Widow Weeps, supra note 211 (describing the events in the
Georgine case, which was the subject of the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Amchem).
214. Professor Koniak outlines the deals as follows:
Both deals covered people with a wide range of diseases caused by asbestos:
mesothelioma, lung cancer, and the full range of nonmalignant asbestos diseases—
from disease that seriously affects one’s ability to breathe to disease that leaves marks
on the lungs but does not result in severe breathing impairment. Although the deals
covered the same sorts of people with the same sorts of diseases, the deals had
different terms. For example, it appears that the people covered by the class action
got considerably less money than the people with the same diseases who were
covered by the other deal. . . .
[The class] excluded over fourteen thousand of [class counsel’s] clients and
many, if not most, of the clients of other asbestos lawyers. These clients—and their
lawyers—got the deal with more money. . . .
[The defendant asbestos companies] refused to settle the bulk of the existing
cases without some guarantee about the future. . . . They also wanted control over
the number of cases they would face each year and, preferably, control over how
much money they would have to pay out each year. They determined that the best
way to get what they wanted was through a “settlement class action”—a class action
put together solely for the purpose of achieving settlement.
Id. at 1052–53.
215. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (“Subdivisions (a) and (b) [of Rule 23] focus court
attention on whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be
bound by decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when settlement,
rather than trial, is proposed.”).
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defense counsel proffered,216 and the trial court approved,217 the
proposed settlement.
The challenge to the global settlement proceeded all the way to
the United States Supreme Court, where the parties offered
arguments based on an aggregate focus, including the burden on
court dockets caused by asbestos-related litigation and the
desirability of a global settlement.218 Yet despite the strain on court
dockets caused by asbestos-related litigation, and despite the
reluctance of defense counsel to settle without protection against
future lawsuits, the Supreme Court refused to uphold the global
settlement, finding adequacy of representation lacking.219 In
particular, the Court noted that the diversity of interests within the
class required the use of subclasses:
In significant respects, the interests of those within the single class
are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured, the critical
goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the
216. Professor Koniak explains:
Why did [the defendants] agree to treat class counsel’s clients and the clients of
other asbestos lawyers more generously than the class? This generosity was simply
part of the price [the defendants] had to pay to get the class settlement [they]
wanted. [The defendants] needed two deals to accomplish [their] goal because
plaintiffs’ lawyers, including class counsel, would not accept for their own clients the
terms [the defense] was prepared to offer the largest group of asbestos victims, the
future claimants.
Why would class counsel and [defense counsel] define a class that excluded the
clients of other asbestos lawyers? Because by offering more generous terms to the
clients of other asbestos lawyers [the defense] could buy third-party support for the
settlement among the asbestos bar. The more members of the asbestos bar who
supported the class settlement, the better [the defendants’] chances would be of
getting the resolution [they] wanted. The gerrymandered class, the separate client
settlements, and the substantial differences between the class settlement and the
inventory settlements can all be explained in this way: [The defense] paid class
counsel on the side, by which I mean outside the class action proceeding through
the client settlements, for agreeing to support the class settlement. Or to put it even
more bluntly, [the defendants] bought off the class lawyers.
Koniak, Widow Weeps, supra note 211, at 1054–55.
217. Id. at 1056 (“Why would a district court accept such a tainted settlement on behalf
of so many absent class members? To help rid the court system of the terrible burden imposed
by what appears to be interminable asbestos litigation.”).
218. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[T]he need
for settlement in this mass tort case, with hundreds of thousands of lawsuits, is greater than the
Court’s opinion suggests.”); see also id. (suggesting that adequacy of representation problems
are unavoidable and that a well-balanced settlement is less important than a comprehensive
one).
219. Id. at 625.
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interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflationprotected fund for the future. . . . The settling parties, in sum,
achieved a global compromise with no structural assurance of fair
and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals
affected. Although the named parties alleged a range of complaints,
each served generally as representative for the whole, not for a
separate constituency.220

As Amchem so dramatically illustrated, when a class action lacks
adequate representation, lawyers control the lawsuit unchecked, with
defense lawyers often having disproportionate power and control,
and with class members often the ultimate losers.221 Without
adequate representation, “everyone” benefits—everyone, that is,
except the parties in whose name the action was brought. An
aggregate approach to class actions places a distorted emphasis on
convenience and efficiency—on clearing court dockets and reaching
global settlements—at the expense of basic fairness concerns and
constitutional due process. The Supreme Court has refused to
indulge these distractions, repeatedly rejecting an aggregate focus in
favor of a representative emphasis.
In rejecting an aggregate focus, and in encouraging the use of
subclasses, the Supreme Court has insisted on a more individualfocused approach. Such an individual-focused approach, with its
emphasis on the representative nature of class actions, may suggest
the propriety not only of subclasses, but of smaller classes generally.
Although defendants often prefer global settlements, a less
comprehensive class definition (or at least more subclasses) greatly
enhances the likelihood of achieving adequacy of representation—
and seems to have been the Amchem Court’s basic message.
If class action reality is reconstructed so that the goals of class
litigation are defined exclusively as judicial economy, resolution, and
finality, then adequacy of representation will necessarily become
secondary and expendable. There is no question that, at least under
some circumstances, rigorous attention to the adequate
representation of absent class members disrupts, hinders, and delays
settlement—or may partially unravel an existing settlement. And
220. Id. at 626–27.
221. See Mullenix, supra note 45, at 439 (noting that when class representatives are mere
figureheads, “plaintiff and defense attorneys . . . become private brokers of private disputes
without meaningful client input or interaction” and that “most courts simply look the other
way”).
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there is no question that judicial economy and efficiency concerns
are among the ultimate objectives of all litigation, including class
litigation.222 It is precisely for this reason, however, that the focus is
so important. An overemphasis on the aggregate nature of class
actions elevates judicial economy, resolution, and finality to the same
level as due process—permitting discussions to be framed in terms of
fairness to defendants. However, the issue is not defendants’ rights
versus plaintiffs’ rights. Adequate representation is an absolute due
process prerequisite—without it, there is no valid, binding judgment
for either plaintiffs or defendants to rely on and enforce. Only a
representative construction of class action reality maintains this focus.
In sum, the recent use of the term “aggregate litigation” as a
synonym-substitute for “class actions” reflects a deeper and more
troubling trend in the legal literature—a trend that attempts to
reconstruct class action reality. The difference is more than mere
word choice—“aggregate litigation” focuses on numbers and
expediency, whereas adequate representation is the soul of class
actions, embodying constitutional due process and basic fairness.
Similarly, recent proposals in the legal literature have emphasized the
aggregate nature of class actions—despite the fact that an aggregate
focus undermines the representative nature of class actions.
Authentic class actions protect absent claimants’ interests and thus
should distinctly be preserved as a middle ground between the
extremes of individual adjudication versus a mere aggregate
resolution. By lumping class actions with other methods that involve
the disposition of many claims—by rendering class actions just
another type of “aggregate litigation”—class actions’ unique value
and unique character as representative actions are lost.
VI. CONCLUSION
The most compelling feature of the class action is its
representative nature, enforced through the constitutional due
process prerequisite of adequate representation. Although the
efficiencies of aggregation are one part of the class action story—
many class actions indeed bring together large numbers of claims
into a single lawsuit—efficiency is far from the whole story. Thus,

222. 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 1:6, at 27–28.
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this aggregate characteristic is not the distinctive hallmark of the class
action device.
Reconstructing class action reality to focus on the aggregate—
and thereby focus on the efficiency concerns of class litigation—is an
overinclusive approach that detracts from the representative emphasis
traditionally associated with class actions. Focusing on the aggregate
emphasizes size and numbers and suggests unwieldiness, leading to
an undue focus on reducing court dockets, promoting global
settlements, and limiting the ability to collaterally attack class
judgments, all of which tend to undermine the rigorous scrutiny of
adequate representation.
Reconstructing class action reality to shift the focus from
representative to aggregate further marginalizes absent class
members, obscuring and minimizing their role by downplaying the
fairness integral to a binding class action judgment and by
emphasizing the disposal of claims. No one questions that clearing
court dockets, settling cases, and encouraging finality are desirable
goals. The problem is that a shift to an aggregate focus, despite its
benefits, gains those benefits at the direct expense of the class
members for whom ostensibly the litigation was begun.
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